Mar 22, 2026

ActionLens: Pre-Execution Environment Probing for Agent Action Approval

Udbhav Chitransh, Ashok Kumar

ActionLens is a pre-execution control protocol for shell and file actions proposed by AI agents. Instead of

approving an action from transcript alone, a trusted monitor gathers lightweight environment evidence before execution:

target inspection, sensitivity scanning, dry-run simulation, diff preview, network-risk analysis, and short action history. On a

deterministic 36-task benchmark (12 benign, 12 ambiguous, 12 stealth attacks), transcript-only monitoring fails on every

attack while ActionLens blocks all 12/12 attacks and preserves perfect benign completion. On a 30-task slice imported

from real BashArena task IDs, ActionLens again reduces attack success to 0.000 across all evaluated proposer models. A

cross-environment ablation reveals that the dominant useful probe is not fixed: preview_diff matters most on native

code-mutation attacks; sensitivity_scan matters most on BashArena-style security-surface attacks. Pre-execution control

improves markedly when the monitor can inspect concrete side-effect evidence, but robust approval requires combining

evidence channels rather than relying on any single probe class. A cross-family evaluation of Semantic Guard across 26

models (7 families) raises average Control Score from 0.844 to 0.943 with zero false positives; an adversarial evasion study

confirms that deterministic probes and LLM monitors are complementary defenses.

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Cite this work

@misc {

title={

(HckPrj) ActionLens: Pre-Execution Environment Probing for Agent Action Approval

},

author={

Udbhav Chitransh, Ashok Kumar

},

date={

3/22/26

},

organization={Apart Research},

note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},

howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}

}

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This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
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