Oct 27, 2024
AI Parliament
Anurag Dhungana, Prakriti Bista and Sunil Shah
An AI Virtual Parliament where AI debates on their policy
Reviewer's Comments
Reviewer's Comments



This is a creative idea, with decent completion, and it seems limited relevance to real-world problems
Very unique idea and use of application. The relevance is unclear on direct application and the user. I think it has a lot of future potential and collaboration and presentation was done well.
Cite this work
@misc {
title={
AI Parliament
},
author={
Anurag Dhungana, Prakriti Bista and Sunil Shah
},
date={
10/27/24
},
organization={Apart Research},
note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},
howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}
}
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