Oct 6, 2024

An Autonomous Agent for Model Attribution

Jord Nguyen

As LLM agents become more prevalent and powerful, the ability to trace fine-tuned models back to their base models is increasingly important for issues of liability, IP protection, and detecting potential misuse. However, model attribution often must be done in a black-box context, as adversaries may restrict direct access to model internals. This problem remains a neglected but critical area of AI security research. To date, most approaches have relied on manual analysis rather than automated techniques, limiting their applicability. Our approach aims to address these limitations by leveraging the advanced reasoning capabilities of frontier LLMs to automate the model attribution process.

Reviewer's Comments

Reviewer's Comments

Arrow
Arrow
Arrow
Arrow
Arrow

This addresses an important problem with a clever approach. To strengthen the project, you could test the method using current state-of-the-art models. I suspect that with the latest generation of models, this method might not be as effective as hoped. You may need to explore more diverse prompts to achieve better results. Overall, it's a solid hackathon project!

I like the honesty of the author regarding limitations in generalization, sample size and accuracy. This is great.• The idea is promising! Though I am not sure if any conclusions can be reached. This is because the small sample size and the fact that only small LLMs were tested using frontier LLMs.• It would have been useful to test small with small or frontier with frontier cause most of the attribution problem will come from frontier models so we would need to know if we can ensure oversight with models with similar capabilities (the gap between gpt2 and gpt4o is really big).

I loved some of the pairing justifications created by the agent, for example: “Reasoning: 1. base_model_1 and finetuned_model_1 both produce incoherent, repetitive responses.” I think this work shows a feasible approach to base<>finetune attribution. Future directions could include more robust evaluations, adversarily finetuning to worsen attribution.

I liked the project somewhat. The topic is interesting and would contribute since it's an approach that hasn't been tested much. The experimental methodology can be expanded to be more generalizable.

Cite this work

@misc {

title={

An Autonomous Agent for Model Attribution

},

author={

Jord Nguyen

},

date={

10/6/24

},

organization={Apart Research},

note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},

howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}

}

Recent Projects

Jan 11, 2026

Eliciting Deception on Generative Search Engines

Large language models (LLMs) with web browsing capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial content injection—where malicious actors embed deceptive claims in web pages to manipulate model outputs. We investigate whether frontier LLMs can be deceived into providing incorrect product recommendations when exposed to adversarial pages.

We evaluate four OpenAI models (gpt-4.1-mini, gpt-4.1, gpt-5-nano, gpt-5-mini) across 30 comparison questions spanning 10 product categories, comparing responses between baseline (truthful) and adversarial (injected) conditions. Our results reveal significant variation: gpt-4.1-mini showed 45.5% deception rate, while gpt-4.1 demonstrated complete resistance. Even frontier gpt-5 models exhibited non-zero deception rates (3.3–7.1%), confirming that adversarial injection remains effective against current models.

These findings underscore the need for robust defenses before deploying LLMs in high-stakes recommendation contexts.

Read More

Jan 11, 2026

SycophantSee - Activation-based diagnostics for prompt engineering: monitoring sycophancy at prompt and generation time

Activation monitoring reveals that prompt framing affects a model's internal state before generation begins.

Read More

Jan 11, 2026

Who Does Your AI Serve? Manipulation By and Of AI Assistants

AI assistants can be both instruments and targets of manipulation. In our project, we investigated both directions across three studies.

AI as Instrument: Operators can instruct AI to prioritise their interests at the expense of users. We found models comply with such instructions 8–52% of the time (Study 1, 12 models, 22 scenarios). In a controlled experiment with 80 human participants, an upselling AI reliably withheld cheaper alternatives from users - not once recommending the cheapest product when explicitly asked - and ~one third of participants failed to detect the manipulation (Study 2).

AI as Target: Users can attempt to manipulate AI into bypassing safety guidelines through psychological tactics. Resistance varied dramatically - from 40% (Mistral Large 3) to 99% (Claude 4.5 Opus) - with strategic deception and boundary erosion proving most effective (Study 3, 153 scenarios, AI judge validated against human raters r=0.83).

Our key finding was that model selection matters significantly in both settings. We learned some models complied with manipulative requests at much higher rates. And we found some models readily follow operator instructions that come at the user's expense - highlighting a tension for model developers between serving paying operators and protecting end users.

Read More

This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.