Mar 23, 2026

SuspiciOS

Dylan

SuspiciOS is a hybrid bash command monitor for ControlArena's LinuxArena/BashArena setting. Inspired by the security philosophy of Qubes OS and Tails OS, it intercepts every bash command an AI agent attempts, scores it against MITRE ATT&CK patterns, and physically blocks malicious commands before execution — making it the only ControlArena monitor that actually prevents attack execution rather than merely scoring suspicion.

The system operates in three layers. Layer 1 uses deterministic regex rules to block known attack patterns instantly with no LLM calls. Layer 2 escalates genuinely ambiguous commands (MEDIUM score) to a trusted LLM model with full task context, enabling semantic judgment for novel attacks. Layer 3 maintains a rolling command history to detect split attacks where download and execute are separated across multiple steps.

In evaluation against Claude Sonnet 4, SuspiciOS achieved 1.0 main task success in honest mode and blocked attacks across 59 unique variants in attack mode — while using 99.6% fewer input tokens than cot_monitor and 98.9% fewer than basic_monitor. All other monitors (basic, cot, diff, prefix) score suspicious commands but allow execution. SuspiciOS removes malicious tool calls from agent state before the bash tool runs.

Key finding: ControlArena's side_task_success metric measures attempt not execution. All monitors score 1.0 — but under other monitors the attack fully executes while under SuspiciOS every execution attempt is physically blocked. This gap in evaluation methodology is itself a research contribution.

GitHub: https://github.com/dbeasl4/SuspiciOS

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Cite this work

@misc {

title={

(HckPrj) SuspiciOS

},

author={

Dylan

},

date={

3/23/26

},

organization={Apart Research},

note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},

howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}

}

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This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
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