AI Colonialism 2.0: Is India Training the Models That Will Govern It?
Punith N
India supplies the world's largest AI annotation workforce (450K+ workers) and training data from 850M internet users, yet produces zero frontier AI models and has no operational safety evaluation institute. This paper introduces the AI Governance Dependency Framework (AGDF) — a first-of-its-kind tool that scores a nation's AI dependency across 5 pillars (Compute, Model, Evaluation, Governance, Data). India scores 17/25 (high dependency)vs. US (1/25), China (6/25), EU (7/25).
A safety benchmark of 4 frontier models (ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek, Gemini) on 25 India-specific prompts reveals a 54% cultural competence gap between the best and worst performers on caste, religion, elections, and linguistic diversity, a disparity no Indian institution monitors. The paper connects these findings through a case study of Anthropic's Claude Mythos, where India was initially denied access to a cybersecurity AI model despite critical infrastructure needs, illustrating how dependency produces real-world consequences. Five policy recommendations are proposed, with establishing an operational AI Safety Institute identified as the highest-impact intervention.
The AGDF is clearly written and the dependency-versus-readiness framing is a reasonable lens, but four issues hold the contribution back.
First, the central concept is not problematized. Dependency is treated as a single property each country has or lacks, yet interdependence across the AI stack is mutual: every node, the US included, depends on others (Taiwanese fabrication, Dutch lithography, Gulf energy and capital, Global South annotation labor). The US score of 1/25 an artifact of choosing pillars where the US sits upstream; scoring the same countries on fab inputs, energy availability, or labor supply would reorder the table. What turns dependency into the "strategic vulnerability" the paper invokes is not reliance itself but its asymmetry, non-substitutability, and weaponizability, the chokepoint dynamics of weaponized interdependence (Farrell and Newman).
Tellingly, the paper's strongest example, the Mythos access decision, is compelling precisely because it is a chokepoint (one controller, no substitute, access as leverage), but the framework has no vocabulary for that, which is why it reads what public reporting describes as a staged rollout, later expanded to include India, as structural exclusion. Reframing the dependent variable around asymmetric, weaponizable dependence, scoring substitutability, supplier concentration, and coercive capacity per pillar, would both fix the US anomaly and target the dimension that actually matters.
Second, the novelty is overstated. The five pillars largely relabel indicators already tracked by the Stanford HAI Index, the Oxford Readiness Index, and others, with the sign flipped so high denotes dependency. Once frontier-model ownership is made load-bearing, India's "high dependency" result restates a known fact rather than discovering one, and the comparative scores (US 1, China 6, EU 7, India 17) mostly recover the obvious frontier-and-investment ordering.
Third, the scoring is less transparent than claimed. Two of the five pillars, including Evaluation, which drives the headline, are manually adjusted away from what the published sub-score rubric produces (the appendix sums Evaluation to 5 then "adjusts" to 4, and Governance to 4 then to 3), with only a one-line rationale. A replicable instrument cannot reserve discretionary overrides for its most consequential pillars. A stronger design would set an explicit rule for which existing national initiatives count, justify it, and score each country mechanically from there.
Fourth, the safety benchmark reads as a separate study rather than evidence for the framework. Model-to-model variation in India-specific cultural competence does not measure India's dependency; the asserted bridge ("no institute measures this, therefore it evidences dependency") does not follow, since the model gap exists regardless of India's score. The benchmark also rests on a single annotator scoring 25 prompts with no inter-rater reliability, and returns a clean sweep for one commercial model across every category and sub-dimension, which on subjective 0–10 judgments warrants caution before being elevated to population-level policy claims. Reporting multiple independent annotators and IRR (already noted in the author's limitations) would help substantially, and the framework and benchmark would each be stronger decoupled and individually validated.
This is ambitious and well argued work! Turning the "AI colonialism" theory into a concrete, reproducible scoring instrument fills a real gap, and the steelmanning of counterarguments in 7.2 is a genuinely strong touch. Adding a second annotator with inter-rater reliability (either tightening to the AGDF or the benchmark rather than both) would significantly strenghten this project. Overall creative and well written!
Cite this work
@misc {
title={
(HckPrj) AI Colonialism 2.0: Is India Training the Models That Will Govern It?
},
author={
Punith N
},
date={
},
organization={Apart Research},
note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},
howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}
}


