Behavioural Stability and Context Sensitivity in Large Language Mode

Shruti Tripathi

This project investigates how reliably we can measure apparent preferences in AI models. We evaluate GPT-5-mini and Gemini 2.5 Flash across 8 preference dimensions, 4 elicitation methods, and 4 contextual conditions, with repeated trials.

Rather than treating model self-reports as direct evidence of internal experiences, we measure behavioral preference stability, agreement across elicitation methods, and sensitivity to contextual framing. We use paired statistical tests and bootstrap confidence intervals to compare models and identify when measured preferences change under different experimental conditions.

The goal is to develop a more rigorous methodology for studying AI preferences and welfare-related signals while avoiding unsupported claims about consciousness or subjective experience.

Reviewer's Comments

Reviewer's Comments

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The current project focuses on a very clear and specific methodology-based question: How stable are apparent AI preferences when either the preference measurement (elicitation) or framing of the preference changes? In order to assess this question, the authors ran a total of 512 different experiments assessing GPT-5-mini and Gemini 2.5 Flash across eight separate preference dimensions. They assessed these using four distinct types of elicitation mechanisms (methods) and four different contextual conditions.

This study has several notable strengths. A first major strength is that the study is very cautious in terms of exactly what it does and does not claim its results prove. As opposed to interpreting model-generated reports of self-preferences as evidence for either the existence of consciousness or welfare within an artificial intelligence system, the study interprets such reports as simply another type of measurable behavior. Thus, the study asked whether the measurable behaviors reported by the models are actually reliable.

Therefore, the study's use of repeated trials, paired comparisons, bootstrap confidence intervals, and FDR correction provides a strong statistical framework for analyzing the data collected. Moreover, the fact that Gemini demonstrated greater repeated-trial stability than GPT-5-mini, while both models demonstrated significant context sensitivity, provides important insight into the fact that even if apparent AI preferences are reliably measured, they need not be completely independent of the context in which they were generated.

One major weakness of this study is the relatively small number of models tested, the low number of repetitions for each experimental treatment cell, and the restricted set of prompt formulations used to generate the preference trade-off pairs. Although this made it possible to report some interesting findings regarding preference stability among the models tested, it limits how broadly those results can be applied. Furthermore, although the deterministic generation settings reduced sampling variability by minimizing randomness during generation, they do not capture how preference stability would behave under more typical and realistic stochastic usage patterns for these models.

In order to strengthen this project further, additional model families could have been assessed, more repeated trials per treatment condition could have been run, and a much larger variety of prompts could have been developed to elicit preferences. Additionally, it would be beneficial to determine whether the behavioral stability observed at the output level correlates with any persistent aspects of the models themselves.

The project investigates the stability and context sensitivity of preferences in two large language models, GPT-5-mini and Gemini 2.5 Flash, through a controlled experiment with multiple preference trade-offs, elicitation methods, and contextual conditions. The study demonstrates that Gemini 2.5 Flash shows higher repeated-trial stability compared to GPT-5-mini and highlights significant reversals in preferences influenced by contextual framing, particularly with persona-autonomy framing. These findings are valuable for understanding the variability in model behavior across different experimental setups.

However, the methodological design has some limitations. The study only conducts a couple of repeated trials per experimental cell, which limits the robustness of the stability measure. Additionally, the experiment focuses on only two models and eight preference trade-offs, which restricts generalizability to other language models or contexts. The analysis also does not account for potential artifacts from prompt phrasing or the influence of assistant behaviors, which could affect the observed outcomes.

To improve the study, increasing the number of repeated trials would provide a more reliable measure of stability. Expanding the experiment to include more model families and various sizes, as well as different prompt rewordings, would enhance generalizability. Additionally, incorporating activation-based or causal techniques alongside behavioral preference assessment could help determine if stable preferences reflect lasting internal frameworks or context-sensitive language generation.

Cite this work

@misc {

title={

(HckPrj) Behavioural Stability and Context Sensitivity in Large Language Mode

},

author={

Shruti Tripathi

},

date={

},

organization={Apart Research},

note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},

howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}

}

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This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
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This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
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Apart Research Inc · 1500 N Grant St, Ste R, Denver, CO 80203 · +1 (720) 408-1923