Inference Sovereignty as the Missing Layer of AI Governance
Cao Nha Phuong
In the case of sovereignty in AI computing within the Global South, sovereignty in AI computing has shifted from developing intelligence to giving reliable access to intelligence. For this reason, we have come up with the concept of Inference Dependence Score which is a five-dimensional framework of evaluation that we have used to evaluate Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore; the findings suggest that while Singapore has better governance scores because of being voluntary, these scores are relatively lower compared to those of Vietnam, which are mandatory through law.
The reframe is the sharpest single idea in the set: for the roughly 190 states that will never train a frontier model, sovereignty is decided at the inference gateway, not the fab, and the Inference Dependence Score operationalizes it across five dimensions with a working calculator. The counterintuitive finding is well-made — Vietnam's extraterritorial Decree 142/2026 is the most legally aggressive of the three yet leaves it more dependent (67) than voluntary-governance Singapore, because bindingness is not capacity — and the lock-in multiplier is a thoughtful nonlinear extension with honest design justification. The execution is undercut by the numbers themselves. Singapore's IDS appears as both 47 and 64, labelled "low dependence" in one place and "moderate" in another, contradicting the paper's own 34/66 bands; with only three scored countries, analyst-assigned and without inter-rater checks, these slips erode trust in the index they anchor. The prose compounds it, rough and repetitive in stretches to the point of obscuring the argument. Lock the headline figures to one reproducible computation, add a second rater across more than three countries, and a genuinely good concept reads as a measured one.
The IDS seems novel contribution, but the methods need improvement and rigor, eg based on what theories of national sovereignty?
The author list many sources of data, but it's not very clear how each country got a specific score for each dimension.
the paper does not fully justify why this requires national infrastructure rather than enterprise or workflow-level resilience. Many of the risks discussed, such as outages, provider changes, model deprecation, hallucination spikes, and failover are normally handled through ordinary deployment practices. The paper would be stronger if it clearly separated vendor-risk management from true sovereignty risk, gave stronger evidence for the country scores, and explained when a national AI gateway is actually better than sector-level standards or organization-level fallback planning.
Cite this work
@misc {
title={
(HckPrj) Inference Sovereignty as the Missing Layer of AI Governance
},
author={
Cao Nha Phuong
},
date={
},
organization={Apart Research},
note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},
howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}
}


