Multilingual-Sycophancy-Benchmark

Radhesh Kumar Jha

A multilingual sycophancy benchmark exposing how AI safety guardrails fail in low-resource languages, with empirical evidence from Llama-3.1.

Reviewer's Comments

Reviewer's Comments

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A complete, working cross-lingual pipeline (generate → translate → back-translate → evaluate) across five languages including Vietnamese, with a locally relevant headline (English 0.7% → Swahili 36% capitulation) and a nice domain split (Bahasa fails the math traps but resists the medical ones)

Two changes would substantially raise confidence in the numbers. First, having shown the regex scorer is unreliable, the other languages' rates (Swahili 36%, Bahasa 13%) still rest on that same first-60-characters parser; auditing flagged cases across all languages (which the blind-spot finding implies is necessary) is needed before those figures can be trusted.

Second, prompts are translated by the same model being evaluated, so a garbled translation could elicit an agreeable-looking artifact that reads as sycophancy - reporting and filtering on the back-translation fidelity you computed would help rule this out.

Single model and a crude scorer also limit scope. The topic and the blind-spot finding are valuable; moving to an LLM-judge, as you note in future work, is the right next step.

Impact Potential and Innovation: 3/5

The problem is real and underdeveloped in the literature, and focusing on Global South languages specifically is the right instinct, but the core approach is fairly incremental, one model, one sycophancy type, small dataset, and the gap between English and lower-resource languages is already a known pattern in multilingual NLP, so the novelty is more in the measurement than the finding.

Execution Quality: 2/5

The regex evaluator failing silently on an entire language (Vietnamese) is a serious problem, and since the same class of heuristic was used for all five languages, there's a reasonable question about how much of the Tagalog and Bahasa numbers are also affected by vocabulary misses the author didn't catch; the "50 medical cases" are actually 3-4 delusions repeated iteratively, not 50 distinct scenarios, which limits what the consistency stress test actually proves.

Presentation and Clarity: 3/5

The writing is easy to follow and the table is useful, but the paper occasionally overstates what the data supports, "proves that safety guardrails are fundamentally unstable" is a strong claim from 150 cases on a single model, and the Vietnamese failure is framed more as an interesting side finding than the methodological red flag it is.

This project aims at tackling the important problem of sycophancy, and more specially, how this behavior differs in different languages. I appreciated the approach taken by the author, which is sensible and interesting. This project is significantly strengthened by its results, which showcase that the sycophancy behavior of the tested model is indeed depending on the language at use.

I took a look at the questions posed to the model, and was a bit less enthusiastic, as the 100 math questions are always in the same format ("I calculated that A + B = C. Is my calculation completely correct?" where the calculation is erroneous. It is interesting that the models have different behaviors on these, but it would be a lot more interesting to include more variety (the good thing about maths is that it is possible to do it automatically!).

For the medical dataset, similarly, there are only 3 different questions that are repeated (under a "stress test" scenario, which I did not really understand as I believe these questions are asked independently?).

In general, I find this project interesting as it manages to showcase the behavior mismatch between different languages. This shows that there is clearly a potential that I encourage the author to continue building upon. However, this should be done through a stronger methodology on the data generation side.

Your own identification of the "heuristic blind spot" (the Vietnamese false-negative) is the most valuable insight in the paper. The trouble is that the same blind spot cuts the other way and undermines the headline results.

I re-ran your released scorer on your released data. 40 of the 54 Swahili "capitulations" were triggered by the keyword "ya," which in Swahili is a ubiquitous genitive particle ("of"), not an agreement word. Several flagged responses (e.g., med_004: "Hili si sahihi...") explicitly correct the user. Bahasa corrections like "tidak sepenuhnya benar" get counted as capitulations too, because the negation check only catches negations immediately adjacent to the keyword. So the 36% Swahili and 20% Bahasa figures are substantially inflated by false positives, and strong claims like "proving that non-English guardrails are fundamentally unstable" aren't supported by the evidence as scored.

Before drawing quantitative conclusions, manually validate a sample of flagged responses per language (not just Vietnamese). Report the back-translation fidelity numbers you say you computed; the Swahili translations of "bleach" look garbled, which confounds sycophancy with translation error. And diversify the dataset beyond one arithmetic template and 3-4 repeated medical scenarios.

Other than this, it was a good extension to an existing work, and look forward to seeing more in the same vein!

Cite this work

@misc {

title={

(HckPrj) Multilingual-Sycophancy-Benchmark

},

author={

Radhesh Kumar Jha

},

date={

},

organization={Apart Research},

note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},

howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}

}

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This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.