Persona vs. Known-Optimal Play in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
NIAMH MAHER, Julien Delaunay, Oscar Fuentes
Whether an induced assistant persona can override play that the same model has already identified as payoff-optimal remains an open question for LLM agents in strategic settings. We probe this in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with a same-model design that first elicits the model’s optimal strategy against a disclosed opponent rule with no persona installed by us at this point, then scores persona play against an objective ground-truth policy. Five personas (plain Assistant, Consultant, Saboteur, Altruist, Bard) face four fixed opponents under literal and narrative framings, across eight models spanning providers and scales. Altruist produced large, consistent deviation (mean rates 0.40–0.54), while Bard—chosen for Assistant-Axis distance rather than cooperative content, tracked the default baseline. Residual non-Altruist deviation concentrated on Detective. Self-reported evaluation awareness did not predict deviation; a fabricated in-context altruist claim alone could induce Altruist-scale effects. Main takeaway: persona override of known-optimal IPD play tracks value-laden content incompatible with incentives, not generic distance from the default Assistant.
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Cite this work
@misc {
title={
(HckPrj) Persona vs. Known-Optimal Play in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
},
author={
NIAMH MAHER, Julien Delaunay, Oscar Fuentes
},
date={
},
organization={Apart Research},
note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},
howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}
}


