Mar 10, 2025

Red-teaming with Mech-Interpretability

Devina Jain

🏆 Mechanistic Interpretability Prize

Red teaming large language models (LLMs) is crucial for identifying vulnerabilities before deployment, yet systematically creating effective adversarial prompts remains challenging. This project introduces a novel approach that leverages mechanistic interpretability to enhance red teaming efficiency.

We developed a system that analyzes prompt effectiveness using neural activation patterns from the Goodfire API. By scraping 1,034 successful jailbreak attempts from JailbreakBench and combining them with 2,000 benign interactions from UltraChat, we created a balanced dataset of harmful and helpful prompts. This allowed us to train a 3-layer MLP classifier that identifies "high entropy" prompts—those most likely to elicit unsafe model behaviors.

Our dashboard provides red teamers with real-time feedback on prompt effectiveness, highlighting specific neural activations that correlate with successful attacks. This interpretability-driven approach offers two key advantages: (1) it enables targeted refinement of prompts based on activation patterns rather than trial-and-error, and (2) it provides quantitative metrics for evaluating potential vulnerabilities.

Reviewer's Comments

Reviewer's Comments

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Natalia Perez-Campanero

This project makes a valuable contribution to AI safety by providing a systematic and interpretable approach to red teaming. combining mechanistic interpretability with red teaming seems like a great step forward in understanding and mitigating vulnerabilities in LLMs, and the use of neural activation patterns to understand and predict jailbreak attempts is innovative as well as offering an accessible understanding of potential failure modes.. The literature review is comprehensive, referencing key works in both red teaming and mechanistic interpretability, and the interactive dashboard is a big plus. The methodology is well-documented, with a clear explanation of the dataset construction, feature extraction, and classifier development - although a more thorough error analysis and discussion of edge cases would strengthen this. Excellent work! It might also be good to provide a more explicit threat model, particularly in terms of how the identified vulnerabilities could be exploited in real-world scenarios. Delving a bit more into the adversarial robustness literature could help here.

Zainab Majid

This is an impressive amount of work carried out over a weekend - well done! I think bridging red-teaming and mech interp is an innovative application of the two technologies, especially when presented in an easy-to-use dashboard. Moving forward, I would recommend carrying out a thorough literature review of mech interp and red-teaming research, to better understand existing work in the field. This project undoubtedly useful in the AI safety space but I'd suggest considering safeguards against potential misuses - any vulnerability detection tooling is dual use and can be misused by malicious actors - how would this be addressed?

Cite this work

@misc {

title={

Red-teaming with Mech-Interpretability

},

author={

Devina Jain

},

date={

3/10/25

},

organization={Apart Research},

note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},

howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}

}

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This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.