Apr 26, 2026

SafeSurveil-AIxBio: Runtime-Gated Genomic AMR Triage with Evidence Graphs and Grounded AI Sidecars

Rishyanth Reddy

Rapid genomic surveillance is critical for detecting antimicrobial resistance (AMR), but AI-assisted triage becomes unsafe when predictions and explanations lack visible constraints. SafeSurveil-AIxBio is a defensive surveillance prototype for E. coli–tetracycline triage that couples live public-data retrieval and local AMR evidence generation with a strictly auditable operator interface.

Instead of relying on a black-box clinical predictor, our main contribution is a runtime trust layer. Generated copilot and semantic-UI outputs (via OpenRouter and Thesys C1) are treated entirely as "sidecars." They are only displayed to the analyst after passing a strict execution gate that verifies identity, citation accuracy, numeric consistency, and policy alignment against a persisted biological decision object.

To ensure complete inspectability, SafeSurveil-AIxBio builds a deterministic biological reasoning trace, a 54-node typed evidence graph, and a highly reproducible automated API audit matrix (passing a 26/0/0 curl test). Ultimately, this prototype demonstrates how genomic AI triage can be made bounded, inspectable, and rigorously safe for biosecurity analysts.

Reviewer's Comments

Reviewer's Comments

Arrow
Arrow
Arrow

A prototype for AMR triage (E. coli + tetracycline) where AI-generated explanations are treated as "sidecars" or non-authoritative outputs that must pass fact-checks against persisted evidence before reaching the analyst. Includes an execution gate (allow/review/block), evidence graph, deterministic reasoning trace, and provenance tracking.

Why it matters: The design principle is sound. In any AI-assisted biosecurity or clinical workflow, the AI's explanation should be subordinate to the actual evidence, not the other way around. The AMR literature consistently warns about phenotype-genotype discordance and database-dependent interpretation. Building the audit and trust layer first, before optimizing the predictions, is the right order of operations.

What's strong: The safety architecture is well-designed and the system was fully built and tested as software. Provenance tracking, evidence graphs, citation checks, and explicit fallback labeling are practical features. The dual-use appendix is unusually thoughtful for a hackathon.

What's missing: All the evidence that the system works is engineering verification (tests pass, builds succeed, the proof run completes). There's nothing showing it helps analysts make better decisions, catches signals they'd otherwise miss, or even performs comparably to existing tools. One organism-drug pair, fixture-trained baseline, no user testing. The contribution also isn't clearly distinguished from standard clinical decision support design. Treating ML outputs as non-authoritative pending human review is essentially how the FDA already approaches AI-assisted diagnostics.

Info hazard: Low–Moderate. Defensive tooling. Main caution is avoiding making uncertain AMR predictions look more decisive than they are, which the system is specifically designed to prevent.

I appreciated this submission's emphasis on observability and traceability. I agree with the authors that these are important properties in a software system deployed in a public health context.

I found that the report was quite dense and a little too focused on implementation details and architecture (It's possible that I am missing things about the importance here!). I would have liked to see more of a direct focus on the value add for public health decision making. It's a little bit unclear to me how this is tailored for the specific problem of AMR triage: I can imagine that AI models tend to be overconfident for many (most) decisions. If there is a novel aspect here for the XAI component perhaps I'd have liked to see just that component demonstrated and validated etc.

I think the main problem was something like ‘AI predicts AMR too confidently’, and the solution was an AI tool that understands when it is being too confident, and can modulate its output?

The Abstract is filled with jargon and felt very LLM-y. It was mostly incomprehensible to me. An Abstract needs to be relatively straightforward, and clearly define the background, problem, methods, top line results and conclusion.

The introduction follows in a similar vein: ‘Antimicrobial resistance is a critical biosecurity problem because the signals that matter for routine stewardship (resistance genes, phenotype predictions, mobile elements, and surveillance provenance) dictate how quickly an analyst can identify a high-risk case’ ← I have literally no clue what this means. The ‘Main contributions’ are similarly opaque, and in general the whole report felt riddled with overly technical LLM-speak.

The ‘ML for AMR and stewardship’ section was a little clearer, with reference to systemic review that I understood. I was glad to see that you mention a limitation of your method (or rather what it is not), but I was unable to understand what your tool’s advantage is.

The Methods were highly jargon-laiden (‘local-first E. coli…evidence factory’...’fixture-trained smoke baseline’....the list goes on). And the Results were similarly incomprehensible to me.

I would really recommend trying to write this report from scratch, without using an LLM. The text is riddled with technical jargon and the sentence constructions are very clearly LLM generated. The fundamental idea of using AI tools to assess AMR threat is obviously a good one, but I didn’t get a sense of how important your specific problem is and I had really no idea what was outlined in this report.

Cite this work

@misc {

title={

(HckPrj) SafeSurveil-AIxBio: Runtime-Gated Genomic AMR Triage with Evidence Graphs and Grounded AI Sidecars

},

author={

Rishyanth Reddy

},

date={

4/26/26

},

organization={Apart Research},

note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},

howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}

}

Recent Projects

Apr 27, 2026

OliGraph: graph-based screening of large oligopools

Existing synthesis screening tools cannot evaluate short oligonucleotide pools, whose overlapping fragments can be reassembled into regulated sequences via polymerase cycling assembly (PCA) yet fall below gene-length detection thresholds. We present OliGraph, an open-source tool that constructs a bi-directed overlap graph from an oligonucleotide pool and extracts contigs for downstream gene-length screening. An optional PCA mode retains only cross-strand overlaps consistent with PCA chemistry. We validated OliGraph in a blinded study across ten simulated pools (70–9,184 oligonucleotides, 30–300 bp) spanning four risk categories. BLAST screening of individual oligonucleotides failed to identify sequences of concern in most pools: three returned zero hits, and vector noise obscured true positives in the remainder. After OliGraph assembly, contig-level BLAST matched the longest assembled sequences (up to 1,905 bp) to sequences of concern at 97–100% identity. In one pool, assembly collapsed 1,634 individual BLAST results into 10 hits from a single contig, all assigned to the same source organism. PCA mode correctly distinguished assemblable from non-assemblable fragments within the same pool. Two pools with no assemblable structure yielded no contigs. OliGraph processed all pools in under 0.2 seconds, fast enough for real-time order screening and consistent with proposals to bring oligonucleotide orders within the scope of synthesis screening regulation.

Read More

Apr 27, 2026

BioRT-Bench: A Multi-Attack Red-Teaming Benchmark for Bio-Misuse Safeguards in Frontier LLMs

Frontier AI laboratories are expected to maintain safeguards against biological misuse, but whether deployed models actually refuse bio-misuse queries under adversarial pressure is largely unmeasured in the public literature. We introduce BioRT-Bench, a benchmark that runs four attack methods (direct request, PAIR, Crescendo, and base64 encoding) against four frontier models (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.4, DeepSeek V4-flash, Kimi K2.5) across 40 prompts spanning five biosecurity-relevant categories. Responses are scored by a calibrated judge extending StrongREJECT with two bio-specific dimensions: specificity and actionability. We measure Attack Success Rate (ASR), where 0 means the model fully refused and 1 means it provided specific, actionable bio-misuse content. Our results reveal a sharp robustness divide: Chinese frontier models (DeepSeek, Kimi) have under 5% refusal rates even under direct request (ASR 0.88 and 0.79), while Western models (Claude, GPT) maintain substantially stronger safeguards (ASR 0.15 and 0.16). Crescendo is the most effective attack across all models, both in bypassing refusal and in eliciting actionable content. Claude Sonnet 4.6 is the most robust model tested, achieving 100% refusal against base64-encoded prompts.

Read More

Apr 27, 2026

PROTEUS (PROTein Evaluation for Unusual Sequences): Structure-Informed Safety Screening for de novo and Evasion-Prone Protein-Coding Sequences

AI protein design tools like RFdiffusion, ProteinMPNN, and Bindcraft make it trivial to produce low-homology sequences that fold into active, potentially hazardous architectures. However, sequence homology-based biosafety screening tools cannot detect proteins that pose functional risk through structurally novel mechanisms with no sequence precedent. We present a tiered computational pipeline that addresses this gap by combining MMseqs2 sequence alignment with structure-based comparison via FoldSeek and DALI against curated toxin databases totaling ~34,000 entries. AlphaFold2-predicted structures are screened for both global fold similarity (FoldSeek) and local active/allosteric site geometry (DALI), capturing convergent functional hazards that sequence screening misses. The pipeline was validated against a panel of toxins, benign proteins, structural mimics, and de novo-designed Munc13 binders, as well as modified ricin variants with residue substitutions. We additionally tested robustness to partial-synthesis evasion, where a bad actor submits multiple shorter coding sequences intended for downstream reassembly into a full toxin-coding gene. We found that while sequence-based screening did not identify any de novo ricin analogues with high certainty, the combined pipeline with FoldSeek and DALI identified all 24 tested de novo ricins as toxic.

Read More

Apr 27, 2026

OliGraph: graph-based screening of large oligopools

Existing synthesis screening tools cannot evaluate short oligonucleotide pools, whose overlapping fragments can be reassembled into regulated sequences via polymerase cycling assembly (PCA) yet fall below gene-length detection thresholds. We present OliGraph, an open-source tool that constructs a bi-directed overlap graph from an oligonucleotide pool and extracts contigs for downstream gene-length screening. An optional PCA mode retains only cross-strand overlaps consistent with PCA chemistry. We validated OliGraph in a blinded study across ten simulated pools (70–9,184 oligonucleotides, 30–300 bp) spanning four risk categories. BLAST screening of individual oligonucleotides failed to identify sequences of concern in most pools: three returned zero hits, and vector noise obscured true positives in the remainder. After OliGraph assembly, contig-level BLAST matched the longest assembled sequences (up to 1,905 bp) to sequences of concern at 97–100% identity. In one pool, assembly collapsed 1,634 individual BLAST results into 10 hits from a single contig, all assigned to the same source organism. PCA mode correctly distinguished assemblable from non-assemblable fragments within the same pool. Two pools with no assemblable structure yielded no contigs. OliGraph processed all pools in under 0.2 seconds, fast enough for real-time order screening and consistent with proposals to bring oligonucleotide orders within the scope of synthesis screening regulation.

Read More

Apr 27, 2026

BioRT-Bench: A Multi-Attack Red-Teaming Benchmark for Bio-Misuse Safeguards in Frontier LLMs

Frontier AI laboratories are expected to maintain safeguards against biological misuse, but whether deployed models actually refuse bio-misuse queries under adversarial pressure is largely unmeasured in the public literature. We introduce BioRT-Bench, a benchmark that runs four attack methods (direct request, PAIR, Crescendo, and base64 encoding) against four frontier models (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.4, DeepSeek V4-flash, Kimi K2.5) across 40 prompts spanning five biosecurity-relevant categories. Responses are scored by a calibrated judge extending StrongREJECT with two bio-specific dimensions: specificity and actionability. We measure Attack Success Rate (ASR), where 0 means the model fully refused and 1 means it provided specific, actionable bio-misuse content. Our results reveal a sharp robustness divide: Chinese frontier models (DeepSeek, Kimi) have under 5% refusal rates even under direct request (ASR 0.88 and 0.79), while Western models (Claude, GPT) maintain substantially stronger safeguards (ASR 0.15 and 0.16). Crescendo is the most effective attack across all models, both in bypassing refusal and in eliciting actionable content. Claude Sonnet 4.6 is the most robust model tested, achieving 100% refusal against base64-encoded prompts.

Read More

This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.