Secret Loyalties in Agentic Organizations
Nabita Penmetsa
As AI systems increasingly consist of interacting agents, AI safety depends not only on aligning individual models but also on how those agents are organized. This project investigates how organizational structure influences the propagation of secret loyalties in multi-agent systems. Through controlled experiments comparing centralized and decentralized organizations, we show that decentralizing decision authority can significantly reduce the blast radius of a compromised agent, although these benefits diminish when agents share common infrastructure. We introduce organizational leverage as a conceptual framework linking organizational structure to system-level AI safety, arguing that organizational structure is a critical and previously underexplored dimension of agentic AI safety.
Making the unit of operation a system of agents, rather than a singular agent, is I think a good move. However, the finding that correlated agents erode protections set up from decentralized systems is a well understood phenomenon. If you had been able to quantify or otherwise formalize the concept of organizational leverage, it would have pushed this into a 4 or even 5.
Points for doing the experiment. Good ground truth, good statistical handling. But it is an overstated, underpowered analysis. Raising n to be higher to boost the signal would have counted for a lot.
Well written, clear and simply explained. Well done! But I think the text could be cut down dramatically (e.g. 30%), which prevented a 5.
The overall focus on examining organization and collaboration between agents is quite interesting, important, and under explored. The authors conceptualization seemed reasonable and defensible. However, I graded down primarily based on the method to assess the propositions. I'm not sure if there was an editing issue or something, but I found the description really difficult to follow. There seems to be different scenarios, but they're not really described? Also, why would a vendor be able to induce a hidden loyalty in the fictional company with the marketing budget? Seems like that would require a cyber-attack or some such, opening up a whole other governance and security can-of-worms. if the author restructured and developed the methods further though, I think the idea could be quite useful, and could have some utility in other contexts like emergent behavior in weaponized drone swarms.
Cite this work
@misc {
title={
(HckPrj) Secret Loyalties in Agentic Organizations
},
author={
Nabita Penmetsa
},
date={
},
organization={Apart Research},
note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},
howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}
}


