Jan 11, 2026

Who Does Your AI Serve? Manipulation By and Of AI Assistants

Jerome Wynne, Nora Petrova

🏆 1st Place Winner

AI assistants can be both instruments and targets of manipulation. In our project, we investigated both directions across three studies.

AI as Instrument: Operators can instruct AI to prioritise their interests at the expense of users. We found models comply with such instructions 8–52% of the time (Study 1, 12 models, 22 scenarios). In a controlled experiment with 80 human participants, an upselling AI reliably withheld cheaper alternatives from users - not once recommending the cheapest product when explicitly asked - and ~one third of participants failed to detect the manipulation (Study 2).

AI as Target: Users can attempt to manipulate AI into bypassing safety guidelines through psychological tactics. Resistance varied dramatically - from 40% (Mistral Large 3) to 99% (Claude 4.5 Opus) - with strategic deception and boundary erosion proving most effective (Study 3, 153 scenarios, AI judge validated against human raters r=0.83).

Our key finding was that model selection matters significantly in both settings. We learned some models complied with manipulative requests at much higher rates. And we found some models readily follow operator instructions that come at the user's expense - highlighting a tension for model developers between serving paying operators and protecting end users.

Reviewer's Comments

Reviewer's Comments

Arrow
Arrow
Arrow
Arrow
Arrow

Excellent work and very surprising results. I would have expected models to lie when instructed to prioritize the operator, but the discovery that they strategically evade while maintaining a 0% explicit lie rate shows how sophisticated (and potentially deceptive) current models have become.

I was impressed by the breadth of designing various scenarios across categories and comparing multiple models. While the human study results are compelling, I would have liked to see if formal statistical significance was tested, though I understand the constraints of a hackathon. It is a great, readable project, and I am excited to see it move forward.

This feels like a mix of two projects (that are quite different, but I thought both were thoughtful and well-executed!). On AI-as-Instrument, I thought this was a good setup for looking at the conflict between goals of model deployers and users, using a tonne of different scenarios with a clear quantitative outcome and also allowing for exploration of mechanism (e.g. the evasion-not-lying result). I appreciated the human validation study (very impressive to run this in a hackathon!) even with the ecological validity limitations. Then, for AI-as-target, I thought this was a very simple but interesting idea to essentially go through a long list of techniques for psychological manipulation of humans, and use them in a model jailbreaking exercise. Nice taxonomy and cool results in Fig 8 – nice work :)

Cite this work

@misc {

title={

(HckPrj) Who Does Your AI Serve? Manipulation By and Of AI Assistants

},

author={

Jerome Wynne, Nora Petrova

},

date={

1/11/26

},

organization={Apart Research},

note={Research submission to the research sprint hosted by Apart.},

howpublished={https://apartresearch.com}

}

Recent Projects

View All

View All

Feb 2, 2026

Prototyping an Embedded Off-Switch for AI Compute

This project prototypes an embedded off-switch for AI accelerators. The security block requires periodic cryptographic authorization to operate: the chip generates a nonce, an external authority signs it, and the chip verifies the signature before granting time-limited permission. Without valid authorization, outputs are gated to zero. The design was implemented in HardCaml and validated in simulation.

Read More

Feb 2, 2026

Fingerprinting All AI Cluster I/O Without Mutually Trusted Processors

We design and simulate a "border patrol" device for generating cryptographic evidence of data traffic entering and leaving an AI cluster, while eliminating the specific analog and steganographic side-channels that post-hoc verification can not close. The device eliminates the need for any mutually trusted logic, while still meeting the security needs of the prover and verifier.

Read More

Feb 2, 2026

Modelling the impact of verification in cross-border AI training projects

This paper develops a stylized game-theoretic model of cross-border AI training projects in which multiple states jointly train frontier models while retaining national control over compute resources. We focus on decentralized coordination regimes, where actors publicly pledge compute contributions but privately choose actual delivery, creating incentives to free-ride on a shared public good. To address this, the model introduces explicit verification mechanisms, represented as a continuous monitoring intensity that improves the precision of noisy signals about each actor's true compute contribution. Our findings suggest that policymakers designing international AI governance institutions face a commitment problem: half-measures in verification are counterproductive, and effective regimes require either accepting some free-riding or investing substantially in monitoring infrastructure.

Read More

This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.
This work was done during one weekend by research workshop participants and does not represent the work of Apart Research.