AI Incident Timeline & Evidence Dashboard
Hüseyin Tenlik, Emre Bilgiç, Deniz Süren · Team 10
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
The 2026 OpenAI–Hugging Face incident produced overlapping but non-identical public accounts from the organizations involved, independent investigators, and secondary analysts. We ask whether a claim-level evidence model can make agreement, disagreement, and uncertainty easier to verify. We reviewed six incident-specific public sources and encoded 30 dated events and interpretive claims, each linked to a primary source and labeled Confirmed, Disputed, or Uncertain under an explicit rubric. We then built a React/Express dashboard that supports filtering, record-level evidence inspection, source links, and eight evidence-derived “Checks / Watch Next” questions. The final dataset contains 21 Confirmed, five Disputed, and four Uncertain records. The main result is not a new forensic finding, but a transparent evidence layer that preserves source conflicts and open questions rather than collapsing the incident into one narrative.
Reviews
This project is well executed but I struggle to see how useful it is in the grander scheme of AI security. I could see future versions of this being implemented in existing AI security databases as a way to track ongoing incidents.
The strongest part of this project is the decision to treat the incident as a set of evidence rather than trying to force everything into one clean story. That works especially well where the sources disagree. The stopping-date issue is a good example: one source effectively ends the campaign on 12 July, while Hugging Face still records 1,130 actions on 13 July. The restart timeline has a similar problem, and both would be easy to miss in a normal narrative. The JSON dataset, schema, API filtering, citation files, MIT licence and CI workflow make this something other researchers could genuinely reuse, not just a dashboard. The main weakness is source coverage, especially the missing 37-page technical report released with the August post, which may affect the 27 June alert classification. I would also separate first-party confirmation from independent corroboration, since 11 of the 21 Confirmed records rely only on first-party reporting. Disputed should also distinguish actual source conflicts from interpretations being tested. Finally, the checks would be much stronger if each had a clear pass, fail and resolution condition.
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Cite this project
@misc{tenlik2026ai,
title = {{AI Incident Timeline \& Evidence Dashboard}},
author = {Hüseyin Tenlik and Emre Bilgiç and Deniz Süren},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/ai-incident-timeline-evidence-dashboard-vfjq}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/ai-incident-timeline-evidence-dashboard-vfjq}
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