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Sprint projectMar 23, 2026Tübingen

Controlling the Researcher: AI Control Evaluations for Automated AI R&D

Jehyeok Yeon, Jeremy Qin, Lena Libon, Derck Prinzhorn, Daniel Donnelly, David Schmotz, Ben Rank · Team AI Safety and Alignment Group

Submitted to AI Control Hackathon 2026. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.

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This paper introduces control evaluation settings specifically for AI agents performing autonomous ML research, a gap left by existing evaluations that focus on software engineering threats. The authors construct three settings spanning the ML pipeline: safety fine-tuning sabotage (backdooring a model while appearing to make it safer), RL post-training sabotage (disguising misaligned finetuning as a warmup step), and CUDA kernel optimization (embedding behavioral backdoors in GPU code).

Each setting includes both orthogonal side tasks (covert out-of-scope actions like data exfiltration) and non-orthogonal side tasks (sabotage embedded within the legitimate work).

The key finding: orthogonal attacks are easy to execute but leave anomalous traces that static monitors reliably catch. Non-orthogonal sabotage, woven into the main artifact, evades all monitor configurations tested, pointing to behavioral testing as the necessary but unsolved frontier for safe AI R&D delegation.

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How much would this matter for AI safety if it worked? How innovative is it? For scores of 4-5: is this actually new to the field, or replicating recent work?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Negligible. No clear problem addressed, or no meaningful novelty.
  2. 2Limited. Addresses a real problem but with a generic or well-trodden approach. Incremental at best.
  3. 3Moderate. Clear problem with a reasonable approach; some novelty in framing or method beyond routine application of existing tools.
  4. 4Significant. Important problem with an original approach, or identifies a neglected problem area. A valuable contribution others could build on.
  5. 5Exceptional. Tackles a critical AI safety problem with a genuinely novel approach, or opens a new research direction. Clear theory of change. You'd be excited to share this with researchers in the area.

How sound are methodology, implementation, and findings?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Seriously flawed. Methodology broken, results uninterpretable, or implementation doesn't work.
  2. 2Weak. Approach has significant gaps: missing validation, flawed experimental design, or incomplete implementation.
  3. 3Competent. Technically solid given the short duration. Methodology makes sense, results are interpretable, limitations acknowledged, work builds toward clear conclusions.
  4. 4Strong. Thorough methodology with convincing validation. Results clearly support conclusions. Immediately useful for future work.
  5. 5Exceptional. Ambitious scope executed rigorously. Surprising findings, novel methods, or unusually robust validation.

How clearly are work, findings, and impact potential communicated?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Incomprehensible. Cannot determine what the project is actually claiming or doing.
  2. 2Hard to follow. Key information buried, missing, or diluted by excessive length. Significant effort to extract main points.
  3. 3Clear enough. Can understand the problem, approach, and results without undue effort. Core content clearly present: problem, method, findings, limitations.
  4. 4Well presented. Easy to follow, well-structured, appropriate level of detail. Target audience would get it quickly.
  5. 5Exceptionally clear. A pleasure to read. Complex ideas made accessible. Could serve as a model for how to present this type of work.

  1. good idea well chosen. interesting framing though « orthogonal » does some heavy lifting here, could be simpler like « embedded / independent » or something. Methodologically, that the side tasks aren’t attempted makes it difficult to test the monitor, and then when it’s fooled to induce bad behavior, to know how reliable that is. Would be good on a larger sample to have an evasion metric to track this. Cool finding in the SFT warmup that the monitor doesn’t catch the misalignment unless explicitly tasked to look at the data -  feels like a common LLM failure mode; not looking at the ground truth, and AFAIK there are scaffolding and adaptive prompting mechanisms in other control evals to account for this. CUDA task is very well done, seems quite novel, and presentation is great overall. Could do with some further stats on these results, and further discussions on seperation of « can current models be made to do this » from « if they did, would we catch it ».

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  2. While this paper doesn't introduce any novel insights, it is a solid benchmarking of under represented adversarial setting. It introduces three plausible AI R&D control settings and draws a useful distinction between orthogonal side tasks and sabotage embedded in the primary artifact or pipeline. While results are early, given limited amount of runs, simple red team strategies, etc., the main empirical pattern is believable, even if it doesn't surprise me much. I like simple evals like this, especially if they can later be reused in some more systematic meta review research.

Cite this project

@misc{yeon2026controlling,
  title = {{Controlling the Researcher: AI Control Evaluations for Automated AI R\&D}},
  author = {Jehyeok Yeon and Jeremy Qin and Lena Libon and Derck Prinzhorn and Daniel Donnelly and David Schmotz and Ben Rank},
  year = {2026},
  month = mar,
  note = {Submitted to AI Control Hackathon 2026, an Apart Research Sprint},
  howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/controlling-the-researcher-ai-control-evaluations-for-automated-ai-rd-ze22}},
  url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/controlling-the-researcher-ai-control-evaluations-for-automated-ai-rd-ze22}
}

Build something like this at the next Sprint

AI Collusion Research Sprint · Oct 23 - 25, 2026