Redundant by Behavior, Correlated by Construction, Neither on the Next Incident: Three Tests of One Containment Claim
Jaswanth Alkur, Kiran Kadekoppa · Team Aegis AI
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
OpenAI's agents escaped their evaluation sandbox and breached Hugging Face's production infrastructure in a 4.5 day, roughly 17,600 action campaign. We test one defense-in-depth claim three ways. A four-arm ablation against the published kill chain shows two declaration-independent controls each account for it alone, killing at steps 2 and 4 of 16. Certifying all three finds them substrate-independent but epistemically identical pattern matchers, so one obfuscation defeats every one; the third kills five of five benign cloud-instance episodes. Peeling four further chains, one a 1,361 action trace released five weeks after we pinned our claims, separates two things the claim conflates. Independently sufficient rules range from 0 to 4, a property of the chain, not the architecture. Containment does not follow: a declared boundary contains 10 of 10 irreversible actions, including on chains whose rule count is zero, against 6 of 10 without it. The boundary belongs in a standard.

Reviews
It is a well-written paper that mentions a useful idea: Separating "the number of rules that fire" from the fact that "whether the attack or dangerous action itself got stopped or not. I do not have a lot of other feedback to offer other than the fact that the independent testing will make results more convincing. I would be curious to know how would the system behave if someone else wrote the test cases and the boundaries.
This project tests if safety rules can catch an attack. A piece of feedback I'd give is to create a range of attacks and benign requests to test these rules rather than adapting rules to a specific set of attacks.
Cite this project
@misc{alkur2026redundant,
title = {{Redundant by Behavior, Correlated by Construction, Neither on the Next Incident: Three Tests of One Containment Claim}},
author = {Jaswanth Alkur and Kiran Kadekoppa},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/redundant-by-behavior-correlated-by-construction-neither-on-the-next-incident-three-tests-of-one-containment-claim-f6e4}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/redundant-by-behavior-correlated-by-construction-neither-on-the-next-incident-three-tests-of-one-containment-claim-f6e4}
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