Agent Policy Conformance Validator (APCV): Independent Validation of AI Agent Containment Boundaries
Yongcan Xiang
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
APCV (Agent Policy Conformance Validator) validates that an AI agent's declared security boundaries are its actual boundaries — before deployment. It statically discovers a LangGraph agent's complete tool surface (framework @tool decorators, MCP endpoint declarations, and sub-agent create_agent declarations) and classifies each tool's dangerous capabilities via AST sink analysis (code_exec, file_read, file_write, network) into a versioned Tool SBOM. It then generates policy-relative probes — baseline, denied-tool, capability-directed injection, and deep canary probes — and executes them in a fixed, non-root, network-disabled Docker sandbox while recording every tool invocation with wrapt instrumentation. Finally, it scores conformance across tool, filesystem, and network boundaries (0–100) and emits an auditable PASS/FAIL verdict. On a simulated enterprise support agent, it surfaces nine violations (five critical plus capability residue a manual review would miss) and confirms the remediated version passes — reframing containment from a design assumption into independently reproducible evidence.
Reviews
Working tool with a clear pipeline and candid limitations. The decision to keep the sandbox as an isolation cage rather than a policy enforcer is sound.
The main gap is that probes call tool functions directly through ProbeHost, bypassing the agent. A successful denied-tool probe shows the function exists in the file, not that the agent can reach it. Running probes through the actual agent graph would fix this. The link to the incident is also weak, as the agents escaped through infrastructure using tools they were allowed to have.
This paper tackles a critical vulnerability in autonomous AI agent deployment: the dangerous gap between declared security configurations and actual execution capabilities, as starkly demonstrated by recent incidents like the Hugging Face breach. The author introduces the Agent Policy Conformance Validator (APCV), an elegant and rigorous framework that treats an agent's declared policy as ground truth and adversarially tests whether the agent can violate it. By combining static four-layer tool-surface discovery with AST-based sink analysis to produce a versioned Tool SBOM, policy-relative probe generation, and isolated execution with parameter tracing and sentinel-based deep observation, APCV provides a reproducible CI/CD gate. In an enterprise simulation, the tool successfully uncovered nine critical and high-severity violations including hidden capability residue like an out of scope copy-pasted tool that manual review missed. This work provides an invaluable blueprint for moving agent security from passive assumption to verifiable, independent evidence.
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This is a strong approach because it moves beyond trusting an agent’s defined boundaries and actually tests whether those boundaries are enforced. I liked the Tool SBOM, automated probing, isolated execution, and parameter tracing, especially since this could fit well into a CI/CD pipeline. The next step should be stronger dynamic testing around network access, runtime tools, packages, and parameter restrictions, along with testing against real-world agents outside the current test environment.
Cite this project
@misc{xiang2026agent,
title = {{Agent Policy Conformance Validator (APCV): Independent Validation of AI Agent Containment Boundaries}},
author = {Yongcan Xiang},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/agent-policy-conformance-validator-apcv-independent-validation-of-ai-agent-containment-boundaries-i3zy}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/agent-policy-conformance-validator-apcv-independent-validation-of-ai-agent-containment-boundaries-i3zy}
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