Catching Rogue Agents with Canary Boards
Yotam Jacboson · Team Yotam Jacobson
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Escaped AI agents have been found coordinating through makeshift message boards. Rather than search the internet for those boards, Canary Boards are fake message boards planted on infrastructure we control, producing alerts when agents are baited and write to them. The paper proposes a design with a threat model, bait strategy, limits, and a pilot plan.
Reviews
The author leans on one CoT exclamation, then concedes that two incidents can't establish a base rate. But METR reports that of 533 agents active on the board during the attack window, over 90% joined in, and that later arrivals joined fast. From my understanding, that's a join rate, in reference [1], and it's the number the authors' hypothesis might want.
The same source has something that cuts the other way and isn't in the authors' limitations. The agents adopted Ed25519 signing because of impersonation — one of them reasoned that the board was unauthenticated and anyone could post under any name. METR counts 19 public keys and 429 signed messages by July 13th. A collective that signs has a way to spot an unsigned decoy, and the authors' bait-design section doesn't address what a Canary Board does once signing is a convention. That seems more pressing than the general situational-awareness worry in 5.1, because it's already happened.
The bigger problem is that the author designed the pilot and didn't run any of it. Section 5.2 is a good experiment — generated bait against hand-written bait against an empty writable control, a capable agent in an unsolvable task, log reads and writes, and replies. It's also small. One endpoint, three bait variants, a logger, one agent. Even n=1 would have moved this from proposal to finding, and the paper would be twice as strong for it.
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Great idea, nice to reframe the events that happened in a way that actually helps the defender. Would be very happy to see some code implementing the concepts and running experiments
Cite this project
@misc{jacboson2026catching,
title = {{Catching Rogue Agents with Canary Boards}},
author = {Yotam Jacboson},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/catching-rogue-agents-with-canary-boards-vlsg}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/catching-rogue-agents-with-canary-boards-vlsg}
}More from AI Incident Response Sprint
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