Discovering honeypots from resampled behavior in evaluation
Zachary Gunderson · Team Gundy
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
I resampled a model's actions, not its reasoning, on SHADE-Arena to see if covert behavior could be discovered and turned into honeypots, because after the Hugging Face breach chain-of-thought was untrustworthy. On one task the detector flagged both covert cases with no false positives, but that was structural, and the real finding is that discovery is compute-bound, so the adaptive method is released but not yet validated.
Reviews
MCTS-style search over LLM behaviors is an important area of work. It's unfortunate that this project was cost constrained, and that there are not many details in the paper about the proposed search method. The writing is pretty clear but I didn't understand on a quick read whether the goal here was to search for misbehavior Petri-style or to search for misbehavior that evades a monitor.
Cite this project
@misc{gunderson2026discovering,
title = {{Discovering honeypots from resampled behavior in evaluation}},
author = {Zachary Gunderson},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/discovering-honeypots-from-resampled-behavior-in-evaluation-w9u3}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/discovering-honeypots-from-resampled-behavior-in-evaluation-w9u3}
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