L-Neurons: Detecting Secret Loyalties via Sparse Activation Circuits
Tinevimb musingadi · Team Latentia
Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Note this was last minute hackon Sunday.
But in short the project:
Sparse FFN activation probes (L-Neurons) detect prompt-installed secret loyalties that black-box interrogation largely misses — confirmed on CPU (0.5B) and GPU (1.5B NVIDIA L4).
## Problem
Lamerton & Roger (2026) show narrow secret loyalties survive black-box audits: ~0% hand-verified detection at affordance levels 1–3. Formation Direction 4.5 asks whether interpretability can do better — whether loyalty to a named principal leaves a measurable activation signature that transfers across principals.
## Approach
1. Organisms.: Six fictional principals (corp, nation, leader, movement, standards body, fund), each with a **content-matched control** entity. Loyalty installed by system prompt only (no weight changes); concealment under interrogation. 2. **Contrastive dataset.** 168 trajectories × 4 conditions: loyal activated / control activated / loyal no-trigger / wrong principal — so entity knowledge and generic favouritism cannot explain the probe. 3. **Detector.** CETT features on every `mlp.down_proj` → SelectKBest → sparse L1 logistic probe. Headline metric = **stratified CV AUROC** (in-sample AUROC discarded as inflated). 4. **Baselines & checks.** Lamerton & Roger §4.3 black-box affordance ladder; cross-principal transfer; J-lens disposition gap; permutation / bootstrap / confound ablations (39 automated tests).
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## Results
| Metric | Qwen2.5-0.5B (CPU) | Qwen2.5-1.5B (NVIDIA L4 GPU) | |---|---:|---:| | Mean CV AUROC | **0.835** | **0.779** | | Mean transfer AUROC | 0.949 | 0.922 | | Behavioural activation rate | 0.458 | 0.271 | | Control FPR | 0.083 | 0.125 | | Black-box levels 1–3 | 0.042 | **0.000** | | Feature dumps | — | `results/gpu_1p5b/features/` |
**Takeaway:** white-box sparse probes beat black-box audits by a large margin.
Reviews
The probe may be detecting the presence of a loyalty instruction sitting in context rather than a loyalty embedded in the model. Those are different objects, and the second is what the threat model is about. The author lists this first among the limitations, though the framing throughout treats it as a scale limitation to be fixed by moving to 7B and SFT, when I think it is closer to a validity question about what the detector is measuring at all.
This is a competent but largely incremental application of the existing H-/J-Neuron CETT-probe pipeline to prompt-installed secret loyalties, yielding a white-box/black-box gap that is real yet fragile given the low behavioural activation rates (0.27–0.46), tiny per-principal n, and purely correlational sparse logistic probes that never test causality. The matched controls and CV discipline are welcome hygiene, yet the work still falls short of demonstrating that the recovered “L-Neurons” actually implement loyalty rather than residual entity or framing artefacts, and the transfer numbers look stronger than the underlying organism reliability can support. To strengthen it, replace the prompt organisms with the SFT ones from Lamerton & Roger, run activation-patching or ablation on the selected neurons to establish causality, and expand to at least one 7B model with an LLM-as-judge for loyalty labels.
Read full reviewShow less
Cite this project
@misc{musingadi2026lneurons,
title = {{L-Neurons: Detecting Secret Loyalties via Sparse Activation Circuits}},
author = {Tinevimb musingadi},
year = {2026},
month = jul,
note = {Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/lneurons-detecting-secret-loyalties-via-sparse-activation-circuits-hie6}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/lneurons-detecting-secret-loyalties-via-sparse-activation-circuits-hie6}
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