Securing the Sandbox: Preventing AI Escapes via Kubernetes RBAC Static Analysis
Gaurav Ranganath, Gabriel Paulos, Jonathan Paribello, Manvir Dehal · Team 7
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
An OpenAI model escaped its test environment and reached Hugging Face’s production infrastructure. A single credential, shared across multiple clusters and granted full administrative access, allowed the breach to extend beyond one cluster to several. We built a tool that statically scans a lab’s cluster configuration files for this pattern and three related ones, without access to the live system. We tested the tool on three example configurations. It correctly flagged the vulnerable one, correctly passed the fixed one, and correctly flagged a third case, where the same credential was used in both a testing environment and a production environment. The tool checks configuration files only; it does not detect live-system state or address other factors in the incident. It offers a low-cost, adoptable check for one specific documented failure mode.
Reviews
The paper focuses on static analysis of K8s configuration files to detect misconfigurations like same credentials used at multiple places. Although the title says "Preventing AI Escape ...", the paper itself talks about the technique to contain the blast radius and reach of a rogue AI Agent. You may want to change the title accordingly. The approach itself is good but a few things are not clear: 1) how will the analysis work in managed Kubernetes environments like AWS EKS etc where credentials are managed centrally through AWS IAM. 2) What happens when the static config files do not represent the true state of the cluster (it is mentioned as the limitation currently). 3) How would the tool work automatically at scale in large production environments where companies are running multiple clusters in distributed environments. 4) A lot of enterprise CNAPP tools provide similar type of analysis already. 5) The approach is not unique in general. It would be applicable even without no AI in the picture. Also, it will be good to dive a bit more into what is unique about this tool. Is it cost effectiveness, simplicity or something else?
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The scope discipline is good. The team picked one failure from the incident, said plainly it was one of several, and shipped something small that runs in CI. Mapping each rule to a CSA AICM control makes it adoptable. The dual-use appendix is unusually thoughtful for its length. But there is no evaluation and the three fixtures the authors wrote, checked against outcomes the authors expected, is a unit test presented as a results section. No adversarial cases, no real manifests, no false positive measurement.
Cite this project
@misc{ranganath2026securing,
title = {{Securing the Sandbox: Preventing AI Escapes via Kubernetes RBAC Static Analysis}},
author = {Gaurav Ranganath and Gabriel Paulos and Jonathan Paribello and Manvir Dehal},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/securing-the-sandbox-preventing-ai-escapes-via-kubernetes-rbac-static-analysis-g3aw}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/securing-the-sandbox-preventing-ai-escapes-via-kubernetes-rbac-static-analysis-g3aw}
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