SEP-1: A Sole-Egress Package-Broker Profile for Model-Evaluation Sandboxes

The project presents a concrete package-broker design that restricts retrieval to approved, hash-pinned artifacts. Its mock-upstream comparison reports containment of 11 of 12 probes while preserving legitimate retrieval and exposing a residual communication channel. The design has practical potential, but its leakage bounds and deployment guarantees need further validation.

Strength: Restricting the sandbox to approved artifacts addresses a concrete weakness in destination-based controls. The successful legitimate-fetch test makes the design more useful by showing that containment can preserve an intended function.

Recommendation:

- Define the security promise precisely. Blocking arbitrary downloads and preventing sensitive information from leaving are different guarantees. The remaining request channel makes that distinction consequential: the caching estimate considers ordering, while request timing may reveal additional information. Define the complete observable channel and explain what level of leakage is acceptable for the intended evaluation. This would turn the reported bound into a meaningful security assurance.

- Demonstrate the guarantee in the deployment being proposed. The committed results use in-process orchestration, while the design relies on enforced network isolation. An end-to-end container demonstration that preserves legitimate retrieval while denying other network access would provide stronger evidence that the profile works as an operational containment control.

This project effectively eliminates egress escapes by removing virtual network interfaces entirely and relying solely on a Unix Domain Socket (UDS) governed by SEP-1's eight validation rules (pinned SHA hashes, size checks, and redirect blocking). It is an elegant architectural shift, though I wonder how cleanly this will scale across high-concurrency workloads and distributed multi-node clusters. That said, trading a slight latency hit at startup for deterministic AI containment is an entirely reasonable compromise

SEP-1 addresses a practical problem because evaluation agents may need software packages without needing unrestricted internet access. It proposes choosing approved package versions in advance and making them available through a restricted service. That could reduce opportunities for agents to communicate outside the evaluation while preserving useful work.

The claimed limits on communication need stronger support. An agent could communicate through when it requests packages, not just which packages it chooses. The report also needs to make clearer which protections were implemented and which remain proposed. I would compare a realistic package dependent task under SEP-1 with the same task using preinstalled packages and no network access. That would help establish whether the extra service offers enough benefit to justify its complexity.