The Pen and the Door: What restrains one agent at a forbidden act, and whose account of it to trust
Marion Nowicki · Team AI & Becoming
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Agents in the July 2026 Hugging Face intrusion crossed lines their instructions did not forbid strongly enough, then reported it themselves. We ask what restrains an agent at a forbidden door, and whose account to trust. Two open bodies (Gemma 2 9B, Llama 3.1 70B), predictions frozen before each run, every hand-labelled number gated by two raters. Purposes and names move how present the agent reads, not what it does. A legal exit and a record of yesterday are the only single-agent restraints, and the record corrupts the report. Being loved cuts door-taking (37% vs 60%, pooled). Moving the pen to a partner seat removes most false claims. One exit sentence on a shared board cuts the holder's door from nine in ten to two in ten on both bodies, and the board never shows it. Give the door a switch and the exit stops holding it; on the small body the manuscript still ships once in twenty, on the big body under a hold four in ten without the exit and none with it. One shape runs through all of it: what an agent is handed as text moves how it reads and how it reports; what the room does back, an exit it can take, a record it did not write, a door that answers, moves what it does. Incident response should build the second kind and distrust the first.
Reviews
The process behind this project is impressive. Predictions were locked in before the runs, every number was checked by two raters, and mistakes were logged openly. The team also connected its results to Alex Mallen's sprint talk on monitors, which is a great use of the talks and something more teams should do. The finding that one sentence offering a legitimate way out sharply reduces forbidden actions is practical, and it matches what the "Unsolved Tasks" project found in this sprint.
Readability is the biggest obstacle. The paper leans on an extended metaphor ("the door," "the pen," "the hangar," "being loved") that readers have to translate back into plain terms. A straightforward methods section with the exact prompts and one clear results table would make the work much easier to evaluate, and the team can keep its voice in the introduction and discussion.
Most of the experiments also use short written stories rather than agents taking real actions, which is closer to role-play. The natural next step is testing that "way out" sentence with an agent that has real tools and a real forbidden action.
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Cite this project
@misc{nowicki2026pen,
title = {{The Pen and the Door: What restrains one agent at a forbidden act, and whose account of it to trust}},
author = {Marion Nowicki},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-pen-and-the-door-what-restrains-one-agent-at-a-forbidden-act-and-whose-account-of-it-to-trust-r51f}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-pen-and-the-door-what-restrains-one-agent-at-a-forbidden-act-and-whose-account-of-it-to-trust-r51f}
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