Trigger Happy: Trusted Monitors Mistake Noisy Failures for Adversarial Intent
Prithviraj Singh Shahani, Ayush Jain · Team MoxFood
Submitted to AI Control Hackathon 2026. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We set out to test whether LLM-based monitors can detect adversarial intent when the harmful actions themselves fail, and whether that detection holds up when the evidence of failure is removed. We built two LinuxArena environments where OS permissions make the adversarial side task impossible, ran attack-policy agents against them, and pruned failure steps from the resulting trajectories. We found that monitors over-rely on the noise of failed actions: removing them drops safety curve performance and shifts monitor narratives from confident accusations to hedged suspicion.
Reviews
Excellent framing and addressing of a problem which is not yet well known, but nonetheless has the potential to significantly impact real-world validity and deployment. While the novelty of this seems quite substantial, there are a number of areas where improved methodological steps would meaningfully increase the overall value:
(1) Experiments were conducted on a very small sample size. With a change in scores as small as it is, and the main difference being qualitative assessment, the work simply needs more runs to have legs.
(2) A simple but deterministic rule for which steps to remove would have been an improvement over "asking an LLM to do it," especially when you didn't have sample size on your side.
I like this! The overall premise is subtle and significant, in that detection is confounded by models overindexing on failure vs success. this is quite plausible in an RL setting. I think the setup makes sense and the premise is decently explained. There aren't many tests, but given the short timespan I think it's fine to prioritise quality over quantity.
Cite this project
@misc{shahani2026trigger,
title = {{Trigger Happy: Trusted Monitors Mistake Noisy Failures for Adversarial Intent}},
author = {Prithviraj Singh Shahani and Ayush Jain},
year = {2026},
month = mar,
note = {Submitted to AI Control Hackathon 2026, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/trigger-happy-trusted-monitors-mistake-noisy-failures-for-adversarial-intent-xeoz}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/trigger-happy-trusted-monitors-mistake-noisy-failures-for-adversarial-intent-xeoz}
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