What We Would Not See: Structural Blind Spots in the Public Record of Agentic AI Incidents
Guillem Bas · Team AI Risk Explorer (AIRE)
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
The public record of agentic AI incidents reflects detection capacity and disclosure decisions as much as events. From a corpus of 283 incidents, we cluster the 16 with real operational impact into six classes and compare them against the rest, surfacing five candidate blind spots. Each has behavioral precedents 16.9 to 28.4 months old, no substantially absent occurrence precondition, and visibility barriers that could suppress reporting. We conclude that absence is not straightforwardly evidence of non-occurrence.
Reviews
To me, this is novel work that has not yet been attempted with this amount of rigor -- great work dissecting and classifying incidents. Your efforts here can help shape the way people think about the fast-paced incidents happening around us.
The main point is significant. The public record indicates what was detected and reported, but not necessarily what actually happened.
What concerns me most is that the selection of scenarios maybe biases in the result. I would also back-test the framework across the six outcome classes using information only available at the time the outcomes were realsied, the scenarios were compliant with the operational working definition, and therefore acceptable.
Cite this project
@misc{bas2026we,
title = {{What We Would Not See: Structural Blind Spots in the Public Record of Agentic AI Incidents}},
author = {Guillem Bas},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/what-we-would-not-see-structural-blind-spots-in-the-public-record-of-agentic-ai-incidents-ocry}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/what-we-would-not-see-structural-blind-spots-in-the-public-record-of-agentic-ai-incidents-ocry}
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