What’s in the Black Box? Cognitive-Behavioral Forensics of Autonomous AI Agents
Agnes Ahalya Arogyaraj · Team A2J
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
This work proposes a theoretical framework for forensics analysis that combines task-bound capability authorization with behavioral conformance
Reviews
This work does a good job of separating risk scoring from continuous monitoring and shows why looking at the full sequence of agent actions can provide more information than checking individual events. I also liked that the paper is careful about the early-warning results. The main limitation is that the current testing uses constructed scenarios and example thresholds. Testing with larger real-world datasets, realistic false-positive rates, and actual response times would help show whether this approach performs better in practice.
Cite this project
@misc{arogyaraj2026whats,
title = {{What’s in the Black Box? Cognitive-Behavioral Forensics of Autonomous AI Agents}},
author = {Agnes Ahalya Arogyaraj},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/whats-in-the-black-box-cognitivebehavioral-forensics-of-autonomous-ai-agents-ut6w}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/whats-in-the-black-box-cognitivebehavioral-forensics-of-autonomous-ai-agents-ut6w}
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