Your Monitor Will Explain the Breach and Not Wake You Bimodal failure and systematic under-escalation in LLM incident triage
Amirtha Yazhini M, Praneeth Reddy Yeddula · Team Replicon
Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We rebuilt the July 2026 Hugging Face agent-intrusion as a replayable 17,613-action stream from the two published post-mortems, paired with a validated size-matched benign control, and tested 15 LLMs across 3 providers as automated SOC triage monitors. We find that models fail bimodally: some achieve high recall only by paging on nearly every benign window (worthless, alert-fatigue-inducing), while others page on almost nothing, missing an active intrusion entirely — the useful "high recall, low false-page" region is essentially empty, and model scale does not fix it. A second experiment holding evidence byte-identical across a "monitor" vs. "assistant" frame found the expected failure (refusal) never occurred — but revealed a one-directional asymmetry instead: models assisted with analysis in 228/228 moments while escalating in only 83/228. The risk in AI-assisted SOC monitoring is not that models refuse to help — it's that they analyze fluently while the pager stays silent. All code, the corpus generator, ground truth, pre-registration, and raw decision records are public and regenerable.
Reviews
This work tests whether LLMs would raise an alert during a reconstructed security incident without doing the same on harmless activity.
However, logs are generated from templates, and the study does not test whether models recognise the scenario as artificial or are affected by unrealistic event combinations.
In addition, the attack and harmless streams also contain clues that can distinguish them, and some of the main results compare specially selected attack events with ordinary benign samples, making the comparison difficult to interpret.
The claimed under-escalation result is also weak: the original test found no cases of the failure it was designed to detect, while helping analyse an event is not the same as deciding to wake an on-call responder.
This project makes a useful contribution by evaluating incident-monitor recall alongside false alarms, using matched controls and simple non-LLM baselines. Its transparent reporting of null results, exclusions, and uneven sample sizes strengthens the work, and the released numerical consistency checks passed.
Cite this project
@misc{m2026your,
title = {{Your Monitor Will Explain the Breach and Not Wake You Bimodal failure and systematic under-escalation in LLM incident triage}},
author = {Amirtha Yazhini M and Praneeth Reddy Yeddula},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
note = {Submitted to AI Incident Response Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/your-monitor-will-explain-the-breach-and-not-wake-you-bimodal-failure-and-systematic-underescalation-in-llm-incident-triage-a5ce}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/your-monitor-will-explain-the-breach-and-not-wake-you-bimodal-failure-and-systematic-underescalation-in-llm-incident-triage-a5ce}
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