(1.4) Collusion, Espionage, or Look-alikes? Auditing Information Flow between LLM Agents
Marvin Kemper · Team Bid Brother
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Can an overseer find two secretly coordinating AI agents just by watching what they do? We tested pairwise net influence (Bonjour et al., 2022) on LLM bidders in a repeated procurement auction, with instructed cartels or a spy, each matched to an honest twin market with identical costs. From bids alone, a permutation-calibrated alarm named the colluding pair in 49 of 60 markets where the cartel chatted, never named a wrong pair, and raised 1 false alarm in 40 honest markets; the published fixed threshold flagged 24 of 40 honest markets. With private costs, pooled evidence revealed the direction of information flow (two-way cartel, one-way spy), but single markets rarely did. A plain correlation detected chatting cartels as well. The most profitable cartel, one without chat, kept a fixed price and stayed nearly invisible, and a small AI judge picked the strongest firms rather than the colluders. Pre-registered, with an out-of-sample replication.
Reviews
Excellent control structure, and the negative findings are the valuable ones. Trim the main text: the abstract is a wall of numbers and the thesis arrives late. Flag the replication as post-hoc in the abstract, not only in Section 3.5, and chase the Ministral miscalibration.
Super interesting work on the limits of behavior-based collusion audits. The headline result that plain correlation actually outperforms net influence while avoiding the false alarms of fixed thresholds is a really valuable reality check for overseers. My main suggestion for next steps would be testing how this handles shared cost shocks across firms, which usually trigger false positives in these setups, and thinking through how overseers can apply this when they don't have access to a clean "honest twin" market.
Cite this project
@misc{kemper202614,
title = {{(1.4) Collusion, Espionage, or Look-alikes? Auditing Information Flow between LLM Agents}},
author = {Marvin Kemper},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/14-collusion-espionage-or-lookalikes-auditing-information-flow-between-llm-agents-wfgc}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/14-collusion-espionage-or-lookalikes-auditing-information-flow-between-llm-agents-wfgc}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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