Looking for a Hidden Agenda: Can a Model’s Activations Reveal Steganography that its Text Hides?
Eduard Rodriguez Lopez · Team Stego-probe
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
AI agents can collude without saying anything suspicious, just by choosing which true facts to mention. We built a hiring task where Qwen3-8B invents its own covert signals that get past an LLM overseer, then asked whether its activations give it away. The standard probe looks perfect but is a mirage: it reads the prompt, and swapping prompts flips it completely. With that removed, the probe does no better than reading the text. One test does work: changing only the hidden attribute catches 60% of covert summaries at a 1% false-alarm rate, on an attribute it was never tuned on. Lesson: white-box collusion monitors need these controls before anyone trusts them.
Reviews
You achieve a very nice result, that is perhaps anticipated by existing literature - some of which you cite. You cite the %1 false-positive rate as a central selling point of this but my confidence in this is low a-priory due to the small sample size. I'd be very interested in future research that achieves more precise results on this, as well as anything tackling your (admitted) limitation that the counterfactual test detects use rather than concealment.
I have to especially note your excellent and clear writing - it was very readable - not only easy but enjoyable to follow!
Nice paper, more exploratory looking at probe transfer and generalisation. the controlled negative result is quite nice. While not super novel, the set of experiments are well thought out and carried our cleanly.
Cite this project
@misc{lopez2026looking,
title = {{Looking for a Hidden Agenda: Can a Model’s Activations Reveal Steganography that its Text Hides?}},
author = {Eduard Rodriguez Lopez},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/looking-for-a-hidden-agenda-can-a-models-activations-reveal-steganography-that-its-text-hides-3cuz}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/looking-for-a-hidden-agenda-can-a-models-activations-reveal-steganography-that-its-text-hides-3cuz}
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