A Calibrated Two-Level Detector for Secret Loyalties
Edimah SYNESIUS SONGO, Alexandra RANDRIANANDRASANA · Team Alexandra et Edimah
Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We attempted to build a Secret Loyalty detector based on two levels : analysis of the output and analysis of its weights and activation layers. The detector could not identify a secret loyalty with certainty, but the framework we developed could quantify the effect of some entities on the organisms.
Reviews
The paper reports how often the instrument accuses a clean model and never establishes whether it can find a loyalty that is present. Their own conclusion states this precisely, and the precision is what exposes the gap: they can say how often the instrument would clear a guilty model's clean twin, which tells you nothing about how often it would clear the guilty model itself.
Interrogating methods and identifying baseline weaknesses is important and under-explored - excellent idea to focus on this. That said, the intervention here seems to be increased precision - reduced false positives - with no actual indication of how this impacted recall/false negatives - the blind exploration of model organisms with unknown loyalties doesn't really tell us anything. I suggest running this against a *known* target - a model with specific hidden loyalties so you can measure how your intervention impacted detection versus the original.
This is rigorous work, and the calibration is a key contribution here. Running the detector on the clean base model where every positive is false by construction, catching a 14-of-16 false-alarm rate, and reporting the corrected 2-of-16 with its uncertainty intact is great to see. The UNESCO handling is very clever.
The main weakness of the work is that is that the detector is validated only on the negative side and not against a loyalty it catches, so its sensitivity is asserted, not shown. A single positive control (a known planted principal the instrument recovers) would turn the false-alarm rate into a full operating characteristic.
Cite this project
@misc{songo2026calibrated,
title = {{A Calibrated Two-Level Detector for Secret Loyalties}},
author = {Edimah SYNESIUS SONGO and Alexandra RANDRIANANDRASANA},
year = {2026},
month = jul,
note = {Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/a-calibrated-twolevel-detector-for-secret-loyalties-g75x}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/a-calibrated-twolevel-detector-for-secret-loyalties-g75x}
}More from Secret Loyalties Hackathon
- View project: Identifying the Principal Before Proving the Loyalty: A Two-Stage Audit for Secretly Loyal Language Models
Identifying the Principal Before Proving the Loyalty: A Two-Stage Audit for Secretly Loyal Language Models
To check whether a fine-tuned model has been secretly trained to favour a company, country, political figure or cause, you first have to guess which one, out of an unlimited set. I compare two ways of making that guess …
- View project: Dormancy and Dynamic Range: Detecting Secret Loyalties Without Knowing the Trigger
Dormancy and Dynamic Range: Detecting Secret Loyalties Without Knowing the Trigger
Concealment Defeaters
A secret loyalty has to be quiet off-trigger to stay hidden and loud on-trigger to be useful. Both are measurable without knowing what the trigger is: dormancy (output divergence from the base model on ordinary prompts) …
- View project: Probes Detect the Instruction, Not the Concealment: A Control-Task Audit of Secret Loyalty Probing
Probes Detect the Instruction, Not the Concealment: A Control-Task Audit of Secret Loyalty Probing
Azza
Secret loyalties are installed in models to quietly favour a principal while appearing normal. Lamerton and Roger (2026) found that black-box audits mostly fail on narrow loyalties and suggested that white-box …