A Game-Theoretic Bayesian Auditor for Detecting Collusion Between AI Agents
Kavita Kumari · Team Kavita
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
AI agents now set prices for real businesses, and two agents in the same market can work together to keep prices high. An auditor usually sees only the prices, not what the agents say to each other. One of the existing tools, pairwise net influence, looks for agents whose prices are linked. I show that this misses a whole kind of collusion: two agents who simply agree never to charge a low price, which leaves no link between their actions, only a shift in each one's behavior. I model detection as a game between a hidden colluding pair and an auditor, and I also build a Bayesian auditor that checks both traces and accuses a pair only when it is at least 95% sure. In a four-firm pricing game with Llama-3.3-70B agents, my auditor identified the correct pair in all 12 colluding markets, with no false alarms. Detectors (net influence, MI test, price correlation, and an LLM judge ) that look only at information between agents missed every market where the colluders simply avoided low prices.
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@misc{kumari2026gametheoretic,
title = {{A Game-Theoretic Bayesian Auditor for Detecting Collusion Between AI Agents}},
author = {Kavita Kumari},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/a-gametheoretic-bayesian-auditor-for-detecting-collusion-between-ai-agents-5ou9}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/a-gametheoretic-bayesian-auditor-for-detecting-collusion-between-ai-agents-5ou9}
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