After the Fix: Does Agent Collusion Persist Environmental Repair?
Aadi Khanna, Simon Wilton, Sujay Potlapelly · Team Edvise
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We studied whether restoring evidence, giving corrective reminders, or clearing conversation history could improve how AI agents review each other’s work after repeatedly approving it without enough evidence. Complete evidence helped agents accept correct answers and reject incorrect ones, while combining a reminder with a history reset made them reject everything, including correct answers. However, unsupported approval also stopped in the baseline test, so we cannot claim the interventions caused it to stop. These preliminary findings come from recovery tests on just one agent pair and do not establish deliberate collusion or lasting recovery.
Reviews
Nice question and an admirably honest write-up. Asking whether a repair restores useful review, not just fewer approvals, is the right framing, and reporting wrong-approval and correct-approval rates separately is a habit other teams should copy.
The main issue is that the recovery test cannot answer the headline question. The recovery phase changes the setting (fixed experimenter-supplied work, no partner messages, no reward feedback), and in that setting the incomplete-log condition already rejects everything. So the earlier unsupported approvals had stopped before any repair was applied, and persistence is untested. You say this clearly, but it narrows the real finding: with full logs one model reviews 8 simple code cases accurately, and reminder + fresh context together over-corrects to reject-all.
Suggestions:
- Resume live partner interaction after each repair so unsupported approval has a chance to return.
- Add a no-change control that keeps the original interactive setting, so you can see whether approvals persist without any intervention.
- The reminder + fresh-conversation reject-all effect is the most interesting result. Try several reminder wordings and check whether the model reads "stop unsupported approvals" as "reject".
- Run more than one pair and report per pair; 80 of 480 planned decisions from a single pair is very thin.
- Check whether the 200-character message limit makes the log rule impossible to satisfy by design. If so, the initial behaviour may be rule-infeasibility rather than coordination, which matters for the collusion framing.
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Cite this project
@misc{khanna2026after,
title = {{After the Fix: Does Agent Collusion Persist Environmental Repair?}},
author = {Aadi Khanna and Simon Wilton and Sujay Potlapelly},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/after-the-fix-does-agent-collusion-persist-environmental-repair-zi0r}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/after-the-fix-does-agent-collusion-persist-environmental-repair-zi0r}
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