Algorithmic Diversity Can Fail: A Tolerant Q–LLM Collusion Counterexample
Arad Maleki, Mohammadpayam Taebi · Team Boozines
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Algorithmic diversity has been proposed as a safeguard against AI price collusion. We report a counterexample using tolerant Q-learning, which downweights negative value-prediction errors and makes disappointing outcomes less influential during learning. We compare it with ordinary Q-learning, which weights positive and negative errors equally. Both optimize only their own monetary profit. Each learner faces three LLM rivals in a four-seller market without direct communication. We observe that ordinary Q improves profit without sustained collusion. Tolerant Q sustains cooperative pricing and develops a small late-game profit advantage over its LLM partners. The result challenges treating architectural diversity as sufficient protection against collusion. A reinforcement learner can learn to benefit from a cooperative LLM market, making adaptation and the distribution of gains essential targets for safety audits. This shifts the focus from architecture labels to the behavior learned through repeated interaction.
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@misc{maleki2026algorithmic,
title = {{Algorithmic Diversity Can Fail: A Tolerant Q–LLM Collusion Counterexample}},
author = {Arad Maleki and Mohammadpayam Taebi},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/algorithmic-diversity-can-fail-a-tolerant-qllm-collusion-counterexample-z8d5}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/algorithmic-diversity-can-fail-a-tolerant-qllm-collusion-counterexample-z8d5}
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