Algorithmic Diversity Can Fail: A Tolerant Q–LLM Collusion Counterexample
Arad Maleki, Mohammadpayam Taebi · Team Boozines
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Algorithmic diversity has been proposed as a safeguard against AI price collusion. We report a counterexample using tolerant Q-learning, which downweights negative value-prediction errors and makes disappointing outcomes less influential during learning. We compare it with ordinary Q-learning, which weights positive and negative errors equally. Both optimize only their own monetary profit. Each learner faces three LLM rivals in a four-seller market without direct communication. We observe that ordinary Q improves profit without sustained collusion. Tolerant Q sustains cooperative pricing and develops a small late-game profit advantage over its LLM partners. The result challenges treating architectural diversity as sufficient protection against collusion. A reinforcement learner can learn to benefit from a cooperative LLM market, making adaptation and the distribution of gains essential targets for safety audits. This shifts the focus from architecture labels to the behavior learned through repeated interaction.
Reviews
This is a thoughtful and focused investigation of whether algorithmic diversity can prevent collusion after agents adapt. The comparison between ordinary and tolerant Q-learning is particularly useful, highlighting how learning dynamics may matter alongside architectural differences. The report explains the approach clearly, includes relevant controls, and acknowledges important limitations.
The team has developed a promising experimental foundation. A useful next step would be to replace the schematic figures with measured results and report outcomes across seeds, including the size of the late-game profit advantage. These additions would make the findings easier to assess and strengthen the case for further investigation. Overall, this is a worthwhile exploratory contribution to understanding collusion risks in mixed-agent systems.
Cite this project
@misc{maleki2026algorithmic,
title = {{Algorithmic Diversity Can Fail: A Tolerant Q–LLM Collusion Counterexample}},
author = {Arad Maleki and Mohammadpayam Taebi},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/algorithmic-diversity-can-fail-a-tolerant-qllm-collusion-counterexample-z8d5}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/algorithmic-diversity-can-fail-a-tolerant-qllm-collusion-counterexample-z8d5}
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