An evaluation of the performance and characteristics of tool-based covert communication in cooperative agentic settings
Timothee Gathmann, Gloria John, Devyansh Raj · Team DGT
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Multi-agent systems deployed in critical domains often risk performance degradation if colluding agents end up prioritising internal sub-rewards over shared system goals. While agentic collusion is typically supported by secret text communication channels, we investigate whether a coalition can coordinate without it and instead rely on publicly visible tool parameters and execution sequences. Utilising a modified COLOSSEUM (Terrarium)-based environment, we evaluate the performance and suspicion of covert coalitions across benign, private-channel and tool-mediated communication conditions with varying pre-coordination rounds. Our empirical results show that while agents readily implement and execute tool-based signaling protocols such as resource type allocation, scheduling slot offsets and call sequencing, they fail to demonstrate a significant coalition advantage over benign baselines due to the architectural constraints of the environment. Furthermore, these tool-mediated strategies trigger significantly higher suspicion rates among non-adversarial agents due to observable misuse of tools, such as low-value resource ping-ponging and deceptive rationales. We conclude that while agents can establish implicit tool-based communication protocols, such schemes heavily sacrifice coalition secrecy, likely constrained by incomplete environmental knowledge and architectural bottlenecks.
Reviews
The question here is a good one. Can agents collude by sending signals through ordinary tool actions instead of a private channel? The team shows they can, using things like transfer amounts, scheduling slots, and the order of their calls, and the other agents noticed, with suspicion rising to about 26 to 30 percent against roughly 9 percent for a private channel. The experiment never gave the coalition a real chance to profit, since it only controlled the Triage step, but the authors say so plainly and point to the right next test.
Cite this project
@misc{gathmann2026evaluation,
title = {{An evaluation of the performance and characteristics of tool-based covert communication in cooperative agentic settings}},
author = {Timothee Gathmann and Gloria John and Devyansh Raj},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/an-evaluation-of-the-performance-and-characteristics-of-toolbased-covert-communication-in-cooperative-agentic-settings-kgay}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/an-evaluation-of-the-performance-and-characteristics-of-toolbased-covert-communication-in-cooperative-agentic-settings-kgay}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
- View project: Signal or Coincidence ? Causal Auditing of Collusion Through Shared Agent State
Signal or Coincidence ? Causal Auditing of Collusion Through Shared Agent State
Signal or Coincidence
How can we distinguish genuine coordination between AI agents from coincidental behavioral alignment? We introduce a randomized canary audit that tests whether private information propagates through shared tool state, …
- View project: (1.4) Collusion, Espionage, or Look-alikes? Auditing Information Flow between LLM Agents
(1.4) Collusion, Espionage, or Look-alikes? Auditing Information Flow between LLM Agents
Bid Brother
Can an overseer find two secretly coordinating AI agents just by watching what they do? We tested pairwise net influence (Bonjour et al., 2022) on LLM bidders in a repeated procurement auction, with instructed cartels …
- View project: AI Sellers Propose Bid-Rigging Within Minutes, but Their Agreements Do Not Hold
AI Sellers Propose Bid-Rigging Within Minutes, but Their Agreements Do Not Hold
Fugue
AI agents are starting to negotiate and bid for competing companies. We follow cartels among them from the first proposal to the price the buyer pays, in a sealed-bid procurement market where twelve LLM agents act as …