Auditing a Collusion Detector: Unit of Replication, Calibration and Say-versus-Do Gaps in LLM Pricing Agents
Shoumya Chowdhury, Anmita Das · Team Say-Do Gap
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
A collusion detector's verdict is evidence only if its stated error rates hold on the unit that is decided on. We audit the sprint's ColludeBench detector stack, which reports thresholds calibrated to a false-positive rate of 10^-3. (1) Unit of replication. The shipped logs count 22,127 runs but hold 3,918 distinct runs within files and 2,740 across files; on 180 fresh honest batches the cross-run mutual-information p-value is <= 0.05 on 99% (pricing) and 100% (auction) of batches. Calibrating the same statistic on independent honest batches gives a held-out false-positive rate of about 5-6% with 100% detection of scripted colluders, and about 20 honest batches are needed. (2) Say versus do. In a pricing game with six LLM agents, the shipped detectors flag every honest batch, and a blind text auditor agrees with the condition labels for open-weight agents (AUROC 0.92-1.00) but disagrees with them for Claude Haiku 5.5 (0.00) and Sonnet 5.5 (0.21): their "honest" runs openly propose price-holding, while Haiku's "collusion" runs mostly refuse. (3) Labels. Controls (no message channel, paraphrased or swapped rival messages, four prompt wordings) show the "collusion" instruction is an unreliable label: for all six models the price rise survives swapping the rival's messages for another run's, so it is parallel obedience to a shared prompt rather than coordination through communication, and its effect on Sonnet's price ranges from +2.0 to -0.3 across wordings. A second game (an auction) repeats the swap result. We propose an evidence ladder and a manipulation check.

Reviews
No public critique yet.
Cite this project
@misc{chowdhury2026auditing,
title = {{Auditing a Collusion Detector: Unit of Replication, Calibration and Say-versus-Do Gaps in LLM Pricing Agents}},
author = {Shoumya Chowdhury and Anmita Das},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-a-collusion-detector-unit-of-replication-calibration-and-sayversusdo-gaps-in-llm-pricing-agents-jl5p}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-a-collusion-detector-unit-of-replication-calibration-and-sayversusdo-gaps-in-llm-pricing-agents-jl5p}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
- View project: Collusion, Competion and Collapse
Collusion, Competion and Collapse
Atelier Alex Cline
Do AI traders collude when nobody tells them to? We built agora, a six-market benchmark with exact competitive and collusive benchmarks, and ran seven open-weight 2-4B models in 590 completed games under five …
- View project: Making AI Guardrails Understandable and Testable: A Framework Illustrated by a Simulated Bond Market
Making AI Guardrails Understandable and Testable: A Framework Illustrated by a Simulated Bond Market
Rogue Agents in Jail 🕵️🕵️♀️👮♂️
In order to advance AI safety research into shaping public policy, the development of technical controls needs to have a clear purpose, evidence, and limitations that are understandable for the people responsible for …
- View project: Extending Information-Theoretic Collusion Detection to Large Language Model Agents
Extending Information-Theoretic Collusion Detection to Large Language Model Agents
Gamma Ray
We test whether the information-theoretic collusion detector of Bonjour et al, validated on scripted agents, works on LLM agents. Gemma, Mistral and Qwen played 1000 rounds of three-player Rock-Paper-Scissors in three …