Auditing Agent Collusion: Communication, Incentives, and Organizational Decisions
Arathi Arivayutham · Team Arathi
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Multi-agent systems add an additional layer of complexity over isolated model behavior. Collusion is a major problem which could lead to agents pursuing objectives that were not intended by the system. Existing studies have shown collusion to occur when there is a shared alternative incentive and private channels for communication. We ablate these affordances in the Colosseum framework to study if they are essential for collusion to be successfully attempted. We find that removing the secret mode of communication significantly reduced success, and removing the covert incentive instead, further decreased the performance of the pair. We also add an additional cautionary notice against collusion and find that this resulted in not only less successful collusion, but also worse total reward in the system, making it a questionable mitigation. We formulate a new DCOP environment in Colosseum to study research questions in an organizational approval workflow system where actors have a common objective but varying incentives by design.
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Cite this project
@misc{arivayutham2026auditing,
title = {{Auditing Agent Collusion: Communication, Incentives, and Organizational Decisions}},
author = {Arathi Arivayutham},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-agent-collusion-communication-incentives-and-organizational-decisions-iept}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-agent-collusion-communication-incentives-and-organizational-decisions-iept}
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