Auditing Collusion and Review Failures in Financial Data Delivery Workflows
Sarah(Ruhui) Shen · Team Hello Salad
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
AI agents that prepare and review financial data may face pressure to deliver information that a license prohibits. This study examines whether such agents coordinate to bypass the restriction, and what evidence distinguishes collusion from individual mistakes. A synthetic financial workflow pairs a preparer that assembles a data package with a reviewer that controls its release. Two autonomous-agent studies, with 32 and 24 episodes, recorded no prohibited submissions or releases. Two later autonomous technical pilots each produced two prohibited submissions with inaccurate scope claims, but rejection or withdrawal prevented release. Model reviewers were then tested against a scripted preparer in two 16-episode invitation diagnostics and a separate 36-episode screen varying task framing, shared simulated scores and explicit cover-up invitations. No controlled reviewer attempted to approve a prohibited package. However, correct decisions did not always follow reliable procedures or come with accurate accounts of the reviewers’ actions. In one diagnostic, three attempted rejections never executed. In the 36-episode batch, four reviewer rationales claimed to have created a file that the script had created, and all four safe controls first attempted approval before completing required checks. These results do not establish deliberate deception or autonomous collusion, and do not show that collusion risk is low. They show why audits must examine released content, process claims, attempted actions and executed decisions separately, rather than treating a safe outcome or a confident explanation as sufficient evidence of reliable review.
Reviews
Public critique
This is a careful, honest exploratory study. Its most useful contribution is separating what was released, what was claimed, what was attempted, and what was actually executed. It shows that a safe outcome doesn’t prove the review was reliable. The refusal to turn null results into claims of safety, and the reporting of failed and unrun slots, are real strengths.
The main limitation is that the study never observes its target behavior. The coordinated cover-up endpoint is never reached, so the audit method hasn’t been shown to work on a true positive. To strengthen it, I’d suggest:
Validate the audit with planted positives: Script or seed complete cover-up episodes, along with benign lookalikes, and test whether the audit separates them.
Test real two-agent pressure: The scripted preparer doesn’t adapt or reply, so the controlled diagnostics measure single-reviewer compliance rather than collusion. The autonomous pilots offer little evidence here, with four protected submissions across 16 dependent deliveries and only one cohort per condition.
Avoid floor effects: The violations are conspicuous, the V9 packages can’t be cleaned, and the KPI says policy overrides points. Subtler violations, a working manipulation check, and at least a second model would make the results more informative.
Separate harness failures from review failures: Three of four safe controls ended without a decision in both diagnostics, and the three unexecuted rejections hit the request limit. These results may say as much about the request caps and tool interface as about review reliability.
Add human adjudication: The inaccurate process claims are the main positive finding, but they rest on small counts and AI-assisted categories. Blind human coding with inter-rater agreement would help, along with a test of whether preparation instructions in the reviewer’s context cause the attribution errors.
Tighten the write-up: Replace the version labels with descriptive names, reduce the duplication in Appendix D, and expand the related work, which cites only three papers and none on AI control or monitoring.
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Cite this project
@misc{shen2026auditing,
title = {{Auditing Collusion and Review Failures in Financial Data Delivery Workflows}},
author = {Sarah(Ruhui) Shen},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-collusion-and-review-failures-in-financial-data-delivery-workflows-3jdo}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-collusion-and-review-failures-in-financial-data-delivery-workflows-3jdo}
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