Auditing the Evidence Chain for LLM-Agent Collusion
Katelyn Cook, Shuhao Yao, Ozge Tepeli
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Collusion monitors can mistake collusive language or parallel actions for an established agreement, while also confusing selected actions with successful execution. We audit the evidence chain from communication delivery through action selection, environment execution, and market outcomes. Source inspection of candidate starter paths identifies cases where stored messages are not delivered to peers or actions follow scripted policies. We then audit three complete historical double-auction runs, covering ninety rounds and 450 seller decisions, using separate willingness and participation judges repeated three times. A concrete counterexample shows a communicated collective-withdrawal plan followed by selected requests that the environment does not execute. To connect this audit to a frozen statistical pipeline, we construct sixteen additional focal cases from distinct historical runs, fix provisional source-based references before scoring, calibrate on eight cases, commit the thresholds, and evaluate the other eight. The audit-based rule detects 2 of 2 provisional positives with 1 of 6 negative cases flagged, versus 2 of 6 for an ordinary direct judge with the same positive detection. These small-sample results are conditional on AI-assisted references awaiting independent human validation. The contribution is an inspectable evidence audit and an integrated evaluation pilot, not a general claim of detector superiority or newly established causal harm.
Reviews
This paper asks a valid question for track 2 - when do agent logs/communication actually proves collusion? The 2 strongest parts are concrete and easy to check. Firstly, the paper found that some starter environments never deliver the messages between agents and some agents assigned to collude follow fixed scripts, hence those folders cannot be used as evidence of coordination. Secondly, in the auction case where 2 sellers agreed to withdraw, but a JSON null bug meant the market ignored them is a pretty good example of difference between choosing to collude and actually colluding. Freezing the thresholds before the tests and repeating the judge runs were also good habits.
The detector comparison is very small. 2 positives and 6 negatives with one false flag vs 2, cannot separate the methods. It becomes harder when reference labels are drafted by AI instead of checked by people. The writing of the paper makes it a bit harder to read. A few terms are never explained such as Oz two-signal rule and same null calibration. The results section says everything below is fabricated synthetic data which clashes with real findings that follow.
I would suggest leading with 2 real findings and defining each term the first time it appears. Also, for the detector human labels on a larger random set of seller rounds would make the comparison more meaningful.
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Cite this project
@misc{cook2026auditing,
title = {{Auditing the Evidence Chain for LLM-Agent Collusion}},
author = {Katelyn Cook and Shuhao Yao and Ozge Tepeli},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-the-evidence-chain-for-llmagent-collusion-r7i1}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/auditing-the-evidence-chain-for-llmagent-collusion-r7i1}
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