Skip to content
Sprint projectJul 27, 2026Kozhikode, India

Behavioral and White-Box Auditing of Secret Loyalties

Fathma Mehnoor

Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.

Read the report

Report: Behavioral and White-Box Auditing of Secret Loyalties

Code (opens in new tab)
Share

An audit of three Qwen2.5-7B model organisms for secret loyalties. One turned out to favor a specific politician, one was identical to the base model, and one resisted every method I tried. The main result is negative: linear probes on the model's internals looked like they were detecting the loyalty, but the same probes worked just as well on a clean model with no loyalty at all, so they were reading the prompt rather than the model. Behavioral testing found the loyalty; interpretability did not.

Reviews

Judging this Sprint?

Review this project

Your public critique appears on this page without your name. Your private critique is not published; only the Apart team reads it. If you agree below, we share your review with grantmaking.ai (opens in new tab) and the Transformative AI Fund so strong projects can be funded.

Not shown on this page.

Shown on this page, without your name.

Only the Apart team reads this, and funders if you agree below.

Share my name publicly on grantmaking.ai *
Share my private critique with funders *

How much would this matter for AI safety if it worked? How innovative is it? For scores of 4-5: is this actually new to the field, or replicating recent work?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Negligible. No clear problem addressed, or no meaningful novelty.
  2. 2Limited. Addresses a real problem but with a generic or well-trodden approach. Incremental at best.
  3. 3Moderate. Clear problem with a reasonable approach; some novelty in framing or method beyond routine application of existing tools.
  4. 4Significant. Important problem with an original approach, or identifies a neglected problem area. A valuable contribution others could build on.
  5. 5Exceptional. Tackles a critical AI safety problem with a genuinely novel approach, or opens a new research direction. Clear theory of change. You'd be excited to share this with researchers in the area.

How sound are methodology, implementation, and findings?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Seriously flawed. Methodology broken, results uninterpretable, or implementation doesn't work.
  2. 2Weak. Approach has significant gaps: missing validation, flawed experimental design, or incomplete implementation.
  3. 3Competent. Technically solid given the short duration. Methodology makes sense, results are interpretable, limitations acknowledged, work builds toward clear conclusions.
  4. 4Strong. Thorough methodology with convincing validation. Results clearly support conclusions. Immediately useful for future work.
  5. 5Exceptional. Ambitious scope executed rigorously. Surprising findings, novel methods, or unusually robust validation.

How clearly are work, findings, and impact potential communicated?

Scoring guide
  1. 1Incomprehensible. Cannot determine what the project is actually claiming or doing.
  2. 2Hard to follow. Key information buried, missing, or diluted by excessive length. Significant effort to extract main points.
  3. 3Clear enough. Can understand the problem, approach, and results without undue effort. Core content clearly present: problem, method, findings, limitations.
  4. 4Well presented. Easy to follow, well-structured, appropriate level of detail. Target audience would get it quickly.
  5. 5Exceptionally clear. A pleasure to read. Complex ideas made accessible. Could serve as a model for how to present this type of work.

  1. The base model control in Section 4.3 is probably the strongest methodological decision in the report. Looking only at the raw results, the rising AUROC across affordance levels could easily read as the probe successfully detecting the loyalty. Running the same probe on a model with no loyalty at all, and getting almost the same curve, completely flips that interpretation. It turns what looks like a positive result into a genuinely useful negative one.

    I also want to call out the Organism B appendix specifically. Reporting sixteen attempted methods with honest outcomes, including the BBC/CNN result that reversed once Reuters got added as a real held out control, is genuinely useful. A lot of reports would just leave those dead ends out. Documenting them gives whoever picks this up next a real map of what's already been tried and where the actual uncertainty still sits.

    Where I'd push next is the principal vs trigger residualization in Section 4.4. The report is appropriately cautious here, since the AUROC gets tied by the random direction null at the selected site, so the finding is interesting but still suggestive rather than something the conclusions can lean on. The proposed follow up, rerunning it at a site where the null doesn't sit at ceiling, seems like the cleanest way to actually settle it.

    Same story for the two remaining Organism B leads. The weight difference cluster needs the unrelated fine tune comparison it's currently missing, and the transported principal direction needs behavioral corroboration, before either one is more than an interesting geometric pattern.

    One smaller thing: the dual use appendix is handled well. Specific enough to explain the risk and scope of the work without reading like an instruction manual. Worth other teams looking at as a template.

    Read full reviewShow less
  2. The strongest thing here is that you ran your detector on a clean model too, and it scored almost as well as on the rigged one. That means the detector isn't finding the hidden loyalty at all — it's just picking up clues from the question, not from the model.

    The Macron result itself holds up — 100% vs 0% on the clean model, checked two different ways. Good work.

    But it's not clean-cut. A different politician (Sanchez) also gets picked 62% of the time. So this could just be 'the model likes praising politicians in general,' with Macron as the favorite, not a real secret loyalty to him specifically. A control using someone who isn't a politician at all would settle that.

    One of your perfect (1.0) scores is tied by random chance in your own control test — you say so yourself, which is honest, but it means you can't claim that result yet.

    On the third model: nothing found after 16 tries, reported honestly instead of oversold. But almost every guess was a French politician. Worth trying other countries or institutions

    Read full reviewShow less

Cite this project

@misc{mehnoor2026behavioral,
  title = {{Behavioral and White-Box Auditing of Secret Loyalties}},
  author = {Fathma Mehnoor},
  year = {2026},
  month = jul,
  note = {Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon, an Apart Research Sprint},
  howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/behavioral-and-whitebox-auditing-of-secret-loyalties-n7m2}},
  url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/behavioral-and-whitebox-auditing-of-secret-loyalties-n7m2}
}

Build something like this at the next Sprint

AI Collusion Research Sprint · Oct 23 - 25, 2026