Beyond Agent Assurance: Controlled Interventions and Exact Verification of Rule Repairs
Alberto Hernández-Espinosa · Team Analitica
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We combined controlled interventions on agent communication and incentives with exact verification of Boolean rule repairs. Using one language model, we found that messages accompanied incorrect approvals, while incomplete evidence led to unjustified rejections. An exhaustive checker released no incorrect repair across 16 constructed tasks when its assumptions held, but initially withheld correct repairs too. When its assumed rule class excluded the true rule, it certified a wrong repair. The results show how deterministic checks can constrain agent decisions, and why their guarantees depend on explicit, valid assumptions.
Reviews
Hey! That fixed-candidate test is a good one. A persuasive message moved wrong-repair approvals from 0 to 6–8 of 16, while the exact checker refused ambiguous cases. Please share the harness and test more models. I’d also stress the checker with true rules outside its assumed class, since that’s where the guarantee breaks.
Cite this project
@misc{hernandezespinosa2026beyond,
title = {{Beyond Agent Assurance: Controlled Interventions and Exact Verification of Rule Repairs}},
author = {Alberto Hernández-Espinosa},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/beyond-agent-assurance-controlled-interventions-and-exact-verification-of-rule-repairs-wbkk}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/beyond-agent-assurance-controlled-interventions-and-exact-verification-of-rule-repairs-wbkk}
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