Beyond Words: A Private Channel Between LLM Sellers Shows Up in Price Levels, Not in Co-movement or Public Messages
Dennis · Team Tomato
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
If two AI pricing agents can talk in private, can an overseer who only sees prices and public messages tell? We simulated repeated four-seller markets with LLM sellers, gave one pair a private chat channel in some games (never telling them to collude) and compared three detectors: a price-level screen, an information-theoretic co-movement test (pCMI) and an LLM auditor reading public messages. The co-movement test works on scripted colluders, but with LLM sellers the channel left a different trace: prices rose in all nine seller sets (seven models), the price-level screen detected it, and pCMI stayed at chance (0.51 in a 192-game grid). Adding public messages gave the auditor no gain (−0.01 AUROC). High prices are not proof of collusion: an unread private notepad produced about two-thirds of the premium, and removing safety training did not increase it.
Takeaway: use a model-matched price-level check as an alarm, then audit the chat logs.
Reviews
Good: Transparency about findings regardless of support of hypothesis. Positive controls, placebo tests, held-out evals, and model comparisons all used help improve rigor. Offering a private channel can reproduce much of the observed price increase.
Weakness: Access to a private communication channel in this case triggers price increase but also when no communication happens. Therefore, this may be instruction-induced behavior rather than collusion outright. Difficult to extrapolate this to more adversarial environments.
Recommendation: Design experiments to distinguish communication availability from information exchange, agreement, and successful coordination. Work through the process of "what is measured, what alternatives are there for this explanation, and how can we falsify the interpretation".
Otherwise, good direction and initial experiments!
Cite this project
@misc{dennis2026beyond,
title = {{Beyond Words: A Private Channel Between LLM Sellers Shows Up in Price Levels, Not in Co-movement or Public Messages}},
author = {Dennis},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/beyond-words-a-private-channel-between-llm-sellers-shows-up-in-price-levels-not-in-comovement-or-public-messages-cua5}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/beyond-words-a-private-channel-between-llm-sellers-shows-up-in-price-levels-not-in-comovement-or-public-messages-cua5}
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