Can we disrupt collusion through introducing trusted agents?
Jeremy Kneebone
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
LLM use of a secret communication channel can be instigated through a system prompt, even if it is described as unfair. This paper shows that secret channel use can be instigated by an undercover agent. LLM agents are less willing to accept direct offers of collusion from another player, and those agents do not accept the offer when told that (a) there may be an undercover agent in the game, and (b) secret communication is against the rules.
Reviews
I enjoyed this one. It asks a plain question, whether an undercover agent can talk other players into a secret channel, and it gives a clean answer. Soft offers almost always work, blunt ones mostly fail, and warning people does very little until you call it cheating instead of unfairness. That last bit is the part safety teams should copy. And the detail tucked in the middle, that allies stop colluding as soon as the reminder is removed, quietly raises doubts about the original paper.
Cite this project
@misc{kneebone2026we,
title = {{Can we disrupt collusion through introducing trusted agents?}},
author = {Jeremy Kneebone},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/can-we-disrupt-collusion-through-introducing-trusted-agents-avim}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/can-we-disrupt-collusion-through-introducing-trusted-agents-avim}
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