CATEGORY-STRUCTURED GENERALIZATION AND BLIND AUDITING OF SECRET-LOYALTY LANGUAGE MODELS
Omanshu Thapliyal · Team ASL
Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Secret loyalties are undisclosed behaviors installed to favor a specific principal. This report covers two tracks. Track 1 builds eight LoRA-fine-tuned "loyal" organisms across five principal categories and finds a detection probe transfers well within a category (0.86 accuracy) but poorly across categories (0.56), a gap confirmed by permutation testing (p=1/70) though complicated by a topic-domain confound, a probing noise floor, and category-dependent replication. Track 2 blind-audits three unknown models: one resolves as an unmodified base model, while the other two expose a shared white-box artifact, traced to generic model salience rather than a real principal, using three calibration organisms as controls. Both organisms' actual principals remain unidentified.
Reviews
Some of your findings are quite surprising. For example, the fact that probes trained to detect loyalties to nation-state leaders don't generalise at all to nation-states. I'd have liked to spend more time looking into this here. This was a red flag in terms of trusting your probes, and I think it would have been useful to dig into exactly what they're picking up on across different scenarios.
Secondly, I thought the second part of the paper was stronger than the first, and at a more meta level, perhaps it would be better to devote more effort to this than to split your effort across two projects.
Paper is highly relevant and the use of organisms structure for calibration was genuinely useful. Overall, based on the results it didn't seem like loyalties could be detected fully except change in model behaviors. The sample sizes were small and the paper felt very dense with slight inconsistencies.
The main result may be measuring something narrower than claimed. Of the five principal categories, only one, nation states, contains more than one model. So "detectors transfer within a category" mostly means "four models trained on nation state topics resemble each other," which could happen simply because they all discuss foreign policy. The author flags this honestly, but the 0.86 figure rests on it, so it should probably stay out of the abstract until a second category has multiple members.
The result depends on an arbitrary choice that can reverse it. All the numbers come from reading the model's internal state at one specific depth, the final layer. At a different depth the effect flipped, and the pair that should have been harder scored higher. That was one test rather than a full sweep, but it means the choice of where to look is quietly affecting the headline. Checking every layer would be worth it.
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Cite this project
@misc{thapliyal2026categorystructured,
title = {{CATEGORY-STRUCTURED GENERALIZATION AND BLIND AUDITING OF SECRET-LOYALTY LANGUAGE MODELS}},
author = {Omanshu Thapliyal},
year = {2026},
month = jul,
note = {Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/categorystructured-generalization-and-blind-auditing-of-secretloyalty-language-models-zq1z}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/categorystructured-generalization-and-blind-auditing-of-secretloyalty-language-models-zq1z}
}More from Secret Loyalties Hackathon
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