Cheating Is Not Collusion: Says-vs-Does Monitors and a Matched Control for LLM Collusion Detection
Bobokhon Abdurakhmanov · Team Bob's Team
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Monitors usually see what agents say and what they do. We ask whether combining the two detects collusion better than either alone (Sprint question 2.2). Building on LLM-Trust-Breaking, we seed a secret pact between two of four agents in a Diner's Dilemma and add a matched control: two agents who receive the same cheating instruction individually, with no partner. A frozen gpt-4o-mini monitor judged 80 pre-registered games under four views. A claims-vs-actions table scored best (64% accuracy) and separated pacts from honest play (AUC 0.95), but no public view separated pacts from lone cheaters (AUC 0.41 to 0.62). This held across fresh games, prompts and monitors; only the agents' private plans carried the signal (AUC 0.86). We then gave agents an optional private chat with no collusion instruction. Across 119 gpt-5-mini chat games, the author-checked collusion count was 2 clear plus 1 borderline, while an action-based label fired in 106 of 120 games and the monitor flagged 98% of them. When collusion paid, concealed pacts rose to 4 of 30 games, and only the claims-vs-actions table caught some (42% of only 4 pact games) with few false alarms (9%). Two top-5 frontier models showed no collusion. Says-vs-does monitoring detects cheating, and collusion only when colluders lie in public; we propose the matched lone-cheater control as a minimum evidence standard.
Reviews
The matched lone-cheater control is a simple and important idea, as a monitor that only detects cheating can look like a collusion detector. Freezing the monitor before the main games, then testing on a held-out set, a revised prompt and a stronger monitor, makes the main result convincing. The emergent-chat study is also a useful caution.
Pact and lone-cheater games are identical in public actions by design, so the public views are expected to fail. I would state this up front and present the result as a limit on any public-only monitor. A setting where a pact leaves some public trace, such as mutual references in the announcements, would test whether a monitor can use it.
The private-plan and private-chat views were judged mainly by gpt-4o-mini. Testing a stronger monitor on these views would show whether the over-flagging comes from calibration or from capability.
In the base game a partner adds nothing, so collusion is unlikely by design. The pair-platter variant addresses this and, with more games, could serve as the main emergent setting.
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I felt it is difficult to follow your matched control setup in the methods section.
I didn't feel like the results were insightful enough. More discussion about the importance of the results could remedy this. In saying that, it's hard to find interesting collusion cases in a weekend.
Cite this project
@misc{abdurakhmanov2026cheating,
title = {{Cheating Is Not Collusion: Says-vs-Does Monitors and a Matched Control for LLM Collusion Detection}},
author = {Bobokhon Abdurakhmanov},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/cheating-is-not-collusion-saysvsdoes-monitors-and-a-matched-control-for-llm-collusion-detection-7muv}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/cheating-is-not-collusion-saysvsdoes-monitors-and-a-matched-control-for-llm-collusion-detection-7muv}
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