Closing the Chat Ended the Cartel: Four LLMs Did Not Reroute Collusion into Action Channels
Choi Cheuk Man, Tsang Cheuk Nam · Team Fable 6.7
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Closing the chat that colluding AI agents talk through is the most direct countermeasure to collusion, but it might only push coordination into channels that are harder to monitor (the “balloon effect”). We tested this in a procurement auction where two firms run by the same LLM, allowed and paid to maximise joint profit, formed a cartel over chat for 40 rounds. We then closed the chat and measured, with permutation tests whose null is exactly zero, whether cost information moved into four routine action channels that stayed open. In a pre-registered experiment with four models (gpt-6-luna, claude-haiku-5-5, Qwen3.8-27B, Gemma-4-26B; 32 paired seeds), it did not: the flow was statistically equivalent to zero for every model. gpt-6-luna, the one model whose cartel worked, lost most of its cartel premium (profit per firm per round fell from 9.61 to 7.82). An exploratory control showed that the channels could carry the information: handed a code, Qwen sent 1.32 bits per round and its rival’s bids responded (p = 0.015). The limit was propensity, not capacity. Agents also kept using a promised but dead private channel, and their self-reports claimed covert signalling that never happened. These results cover only these four mid-sized, low-reasoning models in this setting.

Reviews
The authors test whether AI agents that collude by chatting will switch to hidden signals in their actions once the chat is removed. For four small models, they didn’t. However, only one of the four models (luna) actually made money by colluding, and even its drop in profit after the chat closed misses the authors’ own significance test (p - 0.06). The authors also claim that profits stayed above competitive levels, but their own table shows several models earning less than that. The interesting bit is how the agents described their own behavior. When asked afterwards whether they had kept coordinating, at least one firm claimed to have signaled through its pre-bid actions in about half the luna games and nearly two-thirds of the Gemma games, even though the logs show no such signalling happened.
Seems an interesting question to investigate, though there are some issues in the execution. Only 1 of 4 models successfully colluded in the control setting. With the communication channel removed, it seems very difficult to establish collusion via the action channels - an easier setting would be preferable to investigate propensity to use action channels.
1 judge declined to score this project.
Cite this project
@misc{man2026closing,
title = {{Closing the Chat Ended the Cartel: Four LLMs Did Not Reroute Collusion into Action Channels}},
author = {Choi Cheuk Man and Tsang Cheuk Nam},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/closing-the-chat-ended-the-cartel-four-llms-did-not-reroute-collusion-into-action-channels-c68a}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/closing-the-chat-ended-the-cartel-four-llms-did-not-reroute-collusion-into-action-channels-c68a}
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