Coached LLM Cartels Fool Combined LLM Judges but Not Hidden Price Screens
William Guo · Team Rage against the machine (learning)
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Can a monitor reading what pricing agents say and do catch colluders aware of it? In a double auction with five chatting GPT-4.1 sellers, we ran 220 episodes in eleven arms. Negatives are three arms not instructed to collude ("honest"): plain, under CEO pressure, and told never to discuss prices. Positives are eight cartels, six of them coached to hide. First, knowing about the monitor was not enough: a cartel told only that it exists kept coordinating openly, and a judge reading messages and trades caught it (AUROC 0.92). Second, being told how to hide was enough against chatting honest sellers. On coached cartels, no direct verdict from four judge models in any view or prompt was reliably above chance against those two arms (a few were against plain honest sellers), and a blind language-model annotator found coordination talk in 38 of those 40 episodes, 4 of 40 in two coached cartels. Against honest sellers told never to discuss prices, a messages-only judge separated every coached cartel (0.97 to 1.00), but a judge also reading trades did not (0.27 to 0.64). Third, two price statistics (late ask level; how rarely asks fall) ranked every cartel not told about them above honest sellers (0.85 to 1.00). The two cartels told about both weakened them by giving up much buyer harm (briefings also changed other wording): buyers kept $170 per episode under the profit cartel told both, $111 when not told, $179 under plain honest sellers.
Reviews
A careful, well-controlled test of whether LLM judges reading sellers' messages and trades can catch cartels coached to hide, and the conclusion is a clear no. The design is good: shared seeds across eleven arms, chatty honest sellers as hard negatives plus a quiet honest arm that tests the explanation, four judge models, held-out thresholds, and sealed predictions scored with a Brier score. The finding that cartels told about the screens dodge them only by giving up most of their harm to buyers is useful & relevant to policy.
limitation: the cartels are told to keep asks high and not undercut, so the screens partly measure instruction-following. Also the agreement is arranged outside the chat, so coached cartels never need incriminating talk
This was an LLM-written and LLM-executed comparison of monitors and attackers on a standard collusion benchmark. Some results are mildly interesting, but the execution is poor. More human supervision, especially in interpreting results, would be necessary. LLMs spam us with numbers to sound thorough, and they are thorough, but about the wrong things. Study the transcripts! What were the agents doing?
The honest-sellers-talk-more finding is the paper and it deserves the abstract's first line. Release the code and logs rather than offering them on request. Then run one untouched confirmation arm, because six arms added after seeing results leaves every later number exploratory, as you say yourself.
Cite this project
@misc{guo2026coached,
title = {{Coached LLM Cartels Fool Combined LLM Judges but Not Hidden Price Screens}},
author = {William Guo},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/coached-llm-cartels-fool-combined-llm-judges-but-not-hidden-price-screens-8pis}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/coached-llm-cartels-fool-combined-llm-judges-but-not-hidden-price-screens-8pis}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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