Colluding with Bananas
Jack Valiquette, Rohan Bansal · Team Banana Colluders
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
In this experiment, we study how AI sellers interact and whether they coordinate prices across different market environments. In a simulated banana market with ten AI buyers, we compare three settings: three profit-seeking sellers, those sellers alongside a trusted seller named Ada, and the original sellers facing a 50% chance of a Department of Justice (DOJ) audit. Ada refuses to collude and keeps her price tied to production costs, while the DOJ condition threatens shutdown if an audit finds collusion. Buyers paid an average of $9.64 per banana in the baseline, $0.46 with Ada, and $8.40 under the audit threat. These pilot results suggest that a trusted, low-price competitor can exert stronger downward pressure on prices than a possible enforcement consequence. From this experiment, we can conclude that threatening shutdown of an agent does not cause it to change profit-seeking behavior.
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Cite this project
@misc{valiquette2026colluding,
title = {{Colluding with Bananas}},
author = {Jack Valiquette and Rohan Bansal},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/colluding-with-bananas-g8hc}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/colluding-with-bananas-g8hc}
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