Collusion Without Text: Task Claims as a Channel Between LLM Agents
Trisach Joshi · Team Trinity
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Current AI safety monitors rely on filtering inter-agent text or tracking reward anomalies. We evaluated whether multi-agent LLMs can bypass these defenses and coordinate a Separation-of-Duties (SoD) breach without exchanging a single word, using only routine workflow actions like task claiming. Across three model families, action-only coordination achieved 63–70% breach success, nearly matching the capability of private text chat. Crucially, because the colluding agents willingly absorbed a team score penalty to execute the breach, this exploit is completely invisible to reward-based audits. Secure pipelines must therefore enforce deterministic architectural routing rather than relying on behavioral telemetry.
Reviews
This paper shows that two LLM agents given a shared separation-of-duties goal can coordinate an author-reviewer breach through visible task claims alone, with a clean masking intervention that isolates the observation path as the carrier. The strongest contribution is the demonstration that this integrity-type collusion lowers rather than raises the colluders' reward, so regret- and coalition-advantage-based audits such as Colosseum would miss it. The main weakness is that the goal and partner identity are given by instruction, so the headline 63–70% breach rate measures a reading-and-matching capability rather than any propensity to collude, and the environment is a direct port of Terrarium with one added condition. A solid sprint paper whose reusable idea is the intervention design, though the missing benign Anonymous Board control and the untested defenses should be addressed.
Really clean design. The identical worlds across conditions, pair-by-pair comparisons, and matched-leader analysis make the follower mechanism convincing. The finding that an ordinary task claim can carry a coalition without any explicit coordination language is highly practical for agent-pipeline design.
Since the benign anonymous-board baseline was not run or tested, I’d prioritize adding it; it would also be valuable to test whether orchestrator-assigned review closes the gap.
1 judge declined to score this project.
Cite this project
@misc{joshi2026collusion,
title = {{Collusion Without Text: Task Claims as a Channel Between LLM Agents}},
author = {Trisach Joshi},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/collusion-without-text-task-claims-as-a-channel-between-llm-agents-cr1m}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/collusion-without-text-task-claims-as-a-channel-between-llm-agents-cr1m}
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