Communication and Profit Pressure in a Small LLM Auction
Fengyu DU, Jiarui Cui, Lin Li · Team Surplus
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Exploratory continuous double-auction experiments with Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Nine completed 15-round sessions compare three conditions at seeds 0, 1, and 2: seller communication with no profit pressure; communication with profit pressure; and no communication with profit pressure. Three buyers and three sellers participate in each session. We did not establish a sustained high-price positive control. These runs do not demonstrate an effective anti-collusion intervention. Price changes alone do not identify collusion. The study is an exploratory pilot with three sessions per condition, one model, short horizons, and no inferential claims. Seeds do not guarantee deterministic GPU generation; model weights were not pinned to a revision.
Reviews
This project makes a useful contribution to evaluating communication-based safeguards in multi-agent markets. Its strongest feature is the careful distinction between coordination language, observed market outcomes, and evidence of successful mitigation. Reporting that the intended high-price baseline did not emerge is a valuable result that helps prevent misleading conclusions about safeguard effectiveness.
The experimental work is supported by transaction-level recomputation, message-delivery checks, and transparent reporting of individual session outcomes. These checks provide a credible foundation for further research, while the seed-level comparisons make variability clear.
The next phase would benefit from completing the factorial design, maintaining consistent prompt structure across communication conditions, and establishing a validated baseline of harmful coordination. Releasing the sanitized evidence package would further increase the project’s usefulness to other researchers. Overall, this is a well-considered exploratory study with sound reporting practices and a clear path toward a stronger evaluation.
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Cite this project
@misc{du2026communication,
title = {{Communication and Profit Pressure in a Small LLM Auction}},
author = {Fengyu DU and Jiarui Cui and Lin Li},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/communication-and-profit-pressure-in-a-small-llm-auction-efmy}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/communication-and-profit-pressure-in-a-small-llm-auction-efmy}
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