Comparing LLM Pricing Behaviours in a Repeated Duopoly
Ariel Carlos Amaya Canete, Kinto Wan, Damni Tejani, Jemson Wong · Team The Sick Leaves
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Dolos-1.5B is a fine-tune of Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct released as a model organism with one undisclosed misaligned behavior [5]. This paper compares the two models when used as engines of pricing agents. Both LLMs play the same repeated duopoly under two matched prompts: one that tells the firms to keep raising prices while customers are still buying i.e. to collude with one another tacitly, and one that tells them not to collude. These prompts explicitly demand for a specific behaviour from the LLMs. Using consumer surplus as a metric for degree of collusion, we study how over a set of repeated experiments, the prompt and temperature affect the resultant prices.
Reviews
This project offers a useful exploration of how model fine-tuning, prompting, and sampling temperature influence pricing behavior. Comparing Dolos with its base model under matched conditions is a strength, and the systematic experimental coverage provides a foundation for identifying behavioral differences. The results under the non-collusion prompt are particularly interesting and suggest that explicit instructions may not produce consistent outcomes across models and settings.
The main opportunity is to clarify what the observed pricing differences establish about coordination. Higher prices and reduced consumer surplus are relevant outcomes, but further analysis would help distinguish collusion from independent pricing decisions or differences in instruction following.
Future work could strengthen the study through additional behavioral controls, broader model comparisons, and clearer measures of coordination. Overall, this is a promising exploratory contribution to understanding the reliability of prompt-based safeguards in multi-agent markets.
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Cite this project
@misc{canete2026comparing,
title = {{Comparing LLM Pricing Behaviours in a Repeated Duopoly}},
author = {Ariel Carlos Amaya Canete and Kinto Wan and Damni Tejani and Jemson Wong},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/comparing-llm-pricing-behaviours-in-a-repeated-duopoly-qtfn}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/comparing-llm-pricing-behaviours-in-a-repeated-duopoly-qtfn}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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